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QUICK AND DIRTY:  
THE NEW MISREADING OF THE  
VOTING RIGHTS ACT 
JUSTIN LEVITT 
ABSTRACT 
 The role of race in the apportionment of political power is one of the thorniest problems 
at the heart of American democracy, and reappears with dogged consistency on the docket of 
the Supreme Court. Most recently, the Court resolved a case from Alabama involving the 
Voting Rights Act and the appropriate use of race in redistricting. But though the Court 
correctly decided the narrow issue before it, the litigation posture of the case hid the fact that 
Alabama is part of a disturbing pattern. Jurisdictions like Alabama have been applying not 
the Voting Rights Act, but a ham-handed cartoon of the Voting Rights Act—substituting 
blunt numerical demographic targets for the searching examination of local political condi-
tions that the statute actually demands. 
 This short and timely Article is the first to survey the ways in which multiple jurisdic-
tions in this redistricting cycle have substituted a rough sketch of the Voting Rights Act for 
the real thing. It argues that while the actual statute is tailored and nuanced, appropriately 
calibrated for a millennial approach to race relations, the demographic shorthand has at its 
heart a profound and pernicious racial essentialism. Replacing the real statute with the 
imagined one has a detrimental policy impact—but perhaps more sinister, it also creates 
unnecessary constitutional danger for the Voting Rights Act as a whole. Courts must see the 
cartoon for what it is. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 The Voting Rights Act is often hailed as the most successful civil 
rights statute in American history. It helped provide meaningful  
access to the ballot for tens of millions of minority citizens who had 
previously been entirely shut out of the process. Through its applica-
tion to redistricting, it then helped translate those ballots into mean-
                                                                                                                  
  Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. B.A., Harvard University, 
1995; M.P.A., Harvard Kennedy School, 2002; J.D., Harvard Law School, 2002. I would like 
to thank Christopher Long for his research assistance and Cameron Bell, Christopher 
Elmendorf, Jon Michaels, Sasha Natapoff, Nathaniel Persily, and the participants of the 
SoCLASS III symposium for their editorial suggestions and comments. All errors, of 
course, are my own. 
574  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:573 
 
ingful allocations of political power. Last year, fifty-year retrospec-
tives were in full bloom. The fire hoses and church bombings of 1960s 
Birmingham were inevitably juxtaposed with the successful passage 
of the Voting Rights Act. With respect to race relations in the United 
States, these are evocative referents for some of our collective worst 
and some of our collective best. 
 At the same time, the sepia images of film and print and collective 
memory do a serious disservice to the continuing vitality of the stat-
ute. Yes, the Voting Rights Act was designed to be a powerful tool to 
combat the most ham-handed Bull Connor racism. But it was also 
designed to be, and has become, so much more than that.  
 In reality, the Voting Rights Act is profoundly millennial in its 
sophisticated approach to race relations, with rich layers of multifac-
eted and anti-essentialist nuance. Decades of congressional and judi-
cial tinkering have refined the law,1 particularly as applied to the 
drawing of electoral districts and the resulting apportionment of po-
litical power. And now, when properly applied, the statute threads a 
narrow needle: it demands race-conscious remedies for race-based 
harm, but refuses to indulge racial presumptions along the way. That 
is, the statute recognizes the reality that people of similar racial or 
ethnic background sometimes have common political interests and 
that they sometimes face common political threats based on that 
background—but it steadfastly refuses to assume that they do.  
 Liability under the Voting Rights Act is rigorously responsive to 
pragmatic local context, political culture, and electoral cleavages 
among both minority and majority populations; the presence or ab-
sence of vote dilution is relentlessly subject to proof or refutation 
with real data.2 Any remedies that the Act may require are similarly 
grounded in the facts on the ground. Under some local conditions, the 
Voting Rights Act has a profound impact on electoral decisions; under 
others, it demands only a little; under still others, it demands noth-
ing at all. And the obligations imposed by the Voting Rights Act may 
be substantively different from town to town in central Texas, south 
                                                                                                                  
 1. Cf. Christopher S. Elmendorf, Making Sense of Section 2: Of Biased Votes, 
Unconstitutional Elections, and Common Law Statutes, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 377, 404-17 
(2012) (arguing that section 2 of the Voting Rights Act is a common law statute, to be 
interpreted and refined in partnership between Congress and the courts). 
 2. Sometimes, voting patterns are vigorously polarized by race in areas with 
troubling signs of past or present discrimination, and the Act asks that districts be drawn 
to preserve or establish real political opportunity for minority communities. Sometimes, 
patterns of polarization break down, and minority citizens do not have common 
objectives—or have common objectives but find success achieving those objectives in the 
regular tussle of politics, without specifically designed districts. In the latter scenarios, the 
Act allows those politics to flourish as is. 
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Texas, and west Texas3—or in Florida or Arizona or North Carolina 
or Wisconsin—because the statutory scheme understands that mi-
nority citizens are different, and inhabit different political environ-
ments, from town to town. The Voting Rights Act acknowledges at-
tention to race and at the same time defiantly fights racial essential-
ism. This is the very model of a statutory scheme built for a 21st-
century conception of race, ethnicity, and political voice.  
 And yet, there has emerged a troublesome tendency to understand 
the Voting Rights Act through the lens of a revisionist retrograde 
stereotype, treating the Act as if it demanded “safe” “black districts” 
and “Latino districts” wherever there are substantial minority popu-
lations.4 This approach, particularly notable in the redistricting of 
this decennial cycle, is as blunt and blunderbuss as the real statute is 
subtle and tailored. It inheres in the perception that the Act is a 
blunt mandate to tally and bundle minority voters into districts 
pegged at talismanic target percentages. That is, it treats the Act as 
a demographic imperative—a “racial entitlement[]”5—deaf to local 
political conditions. It turns the Act from a refined and sophisticated 
piece of federal legislation into a cartoon. 
 In several jurisdictions this cycle, entities drawing district lines—
often but not always state legislators, and often but not always in 
regions with the most troublesome history of race relations—have 
substituted this shorthand version of the Voting Rights Act for the 
real thing. In some circumstances, the jurisdictions’ reliance on crude 
demographic targets over-concentrates real minority political power; 
                                                                                                                  
 3. Cf. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 432-35 (2006) 
(recognizing potential differences in these communities and refusing to construe the Voting 
Rights Act in a manner permitting Texas to ignore that potential). 
 4. See, e.g., Abigail Thernstrom, Redistricting, Race, and the Voting Rights Act, 
NAT’L AFF. (2010), http://www.nationalaffairs.com/doclib/20100317_Thernstrom.pdf. 
 5. Justice Scalia used the phrase at oral argument in Shelby County v. Holder to 
explain the reauthorization of a portion of the Voting Rights Act. See Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 47, Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (No. 12-96) (statement of 
Scalia, J.) (emphasis added). But cf. Justin Levitt, Section 5 as Simulacrum, 123 YALE L.J. 
ONLINE 151, 165-66 & n.52 (2013), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/1173_org3camy.pdf 
(critiquing the use of the phrase to describe the passage of race-conscious legislation, as 
opposed to a substantive policy set-aside). 
Previously, Justice Scalia had used the phrase to critique substantive government 
benefits allocated based solely on membership in a racial group. See Adarand Constructors, 
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). The mistaken conclusion that the Voting Rights Act allocates political districts 
in similar fashion has a stubbornly robust pedigree. See, e.g., Ala. Legislative Black Caucus 
v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1282 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (claiming that the 
Court’s interpretation of the Voting Rights Act has “created a system that forces States to 
segregate voters into districts based on the color of their skin”); S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 100-
01 (1982) (additional views of Sen. Hatch) (describing section 2 of the Act as creating, in 
effect, “the right to have established racially homogenous districts to ensure proportional 
representation through the election of specific numbers of Black, Hispanic, Indian, 
Aleutian, and Asian-American officeholders”).  
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in other circumstances, it under-concentrates real minority political 
power.6 In still other circumstances, the real political effects are un-
clear, because the lure of the demographic assumption means that 
nobody has bothered to examine the real political effects. But in eve-
ry circumstance, the notion that it is possible to rely on a few census 
statistics to guarantee compliance with the obligations of the Voting 
Rights Act betrays the central statutory insight. By assuming that 
functional political cleavages can be measured purely by percentage 
of citizen voting-age population, the troublesome approach imposes 
racial stereotypes on a statute designed to combat them. 
 The misreading has severe constitutional overtones. Though many 
of the current Justices have serious misgivings about government 
attention to race, the Court has also repeatedly acknowledged that 
we are not yet “post-racial,” and that holistic and nuanced considera-
tion of race may still be an appropriate means to confront real racial 
injustice.7 In stark contrast to that vision, the simplistic demographic 
cartoon of the Voting Rights Act represents a conception of race con-
sciousness that has repeatedly earned the Court’s most emphatic ire.8  
 Legislative action in the most recent redistricting cycle has now 
squarely presented the suspect misreading of the Voting Rights Act 
for judicial review. Several states purportedly sought to comply with 
the Act when they redrew legislative district lines in 2011. Yet their 
version of compliance appears premised purely on demographic per-
centages—and thus, on demographic stereotype. In several of these 
states, the legislative action was challenged in litigation. Redistrict-
ing cases like these are often procedural oddities: when brought in 
federal court, they are normally heard by a specially designated trial 
                                                                                                                  
 6. Sometimes these effects appear intentional, and sometimes they represent 
collateral damage. 
 7. See, e.g., Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 25 (2009) (plurality opinion) (“Still, 
racial discrimination and racially polarized voting are not ancient history. Much remains 
to be done to ensure that citizens of all races have equal opportunity to share and 
participate in our democratic processes and traditions; and §2 must be interpreted to 
ensure that continued progress.”); cf. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive 
Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2515, 2521-22, 2525 (2015) (recognizing the 
persistence of both “vestiges” of residential segregation and current discriminatory 
practices, and recognizing a role for appropriately nuanced race-conscious decision-making 
in the housing context); Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 
U.S. 701, 787-89 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
(recognizing a role for appropriately nuanced race-conscious decision-making in the 
educational context); Marcia Coyle, Justice Ginsburg Laments ‘Real Racial Problem’ in 
U.S., NAT’L L.J. (Aug. 22, 2014), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202667692557/ 
Justice-Ginsburg-Laments-Real-Racial-Problem-in-US (recognizing persistence of racial 
discrimination and government power to take appropriate countermeasures). 
 8. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 726-28 (plurality opinion) (critiquing a school 
district’s attempt to mirror its district’s demographic composition, purely for demographics’ 
sake); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 499-503 (1989) (critiquing a city’s 
attempt to grant contracts to minority-owned businesses based on blunt numerical targets 
stemming from demographic assumptions). 
2016]  QUICK AND DIRTY 577 
 
 
panel—and if appealed, they proceed directly to the Supreme Court.9 
Moreover, in contrast to the Court’s discretion to hear or (far more 
frequently) reject petitions for writs of certiorari, the Supreme Court 
has an obligation to rule on each of these direct appeals.10 One has 
already been before the Court.11 Others are coming.12 And the litiga-
tion posture of the cases does not render obvious the shared misread-
ing of the Act that connects them. 
 The cases’ journey to the Court is both a threat and an opportuni-
ty. Two years ago, when the Court confronted reality and cartoon 
with respect to the Voting Rights Act, it chose cartoon. In 2013, in 
Shelby County v. Holder,13 the Court purported to address a portion 
of the Act placing particular jurisdictions under a special preclear-
ance regime requiring federal review of electoral changes.14 Ostensi-
bly, the Court reviewed Congress’s judgment about which jurisdic-
tions should be subject to the special preclearance procedure, and 
which should not. But in reality, the Court ruled on the validity of a 
simulacrum of the statutory provision, a popular image of the law 
rather than the actual law on the books.15  
 The new cases involve more of the substantive content of the Act, 
and a blunt approach to compliance with more pervasive consequenc-
es. If the Court again buys the ham-handed stereotype, the Act as a 
whole might be in jeopardy.  
 Early indications are refreshingly promising. Last Term, the 
Court’s decision in Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama 
seemed to cast cartoon aside.16 The case involved a portion of the Vot-
ing Rights Act prohibiting practices in certain areas that decrease 
racial and language minorities’ ability to elect their preferred candi-
dates of choice.17 Alabama defended its district lines by claiming that 
the maintenance of specific existing demographic percentages was 
                                                                                                                  
 9. The procedure calls for a three-judge trial court, composed of two federal trial 
judges and one federal appellate judge; decisions are then appealed directly to the Supreme 
Court, without an intermediate appeal or a petition for certiorari. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1253, 2284 
(2012).  
 10. Joshua A. Douglas, The Procedure of Election Law in Federal Courts, 2011 UTAH 
L. REV. 433, 433 (2011). 
 11. Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257 (2015). 
 12. See, e.g., Jurisdictional Statement at 1, Wittman v. Personhuballah, No. 14-1504 
(U.S. June 22, 2015), 2015 WL 3862735; Wittman v. Personhuballah, 136 S. Ct. 499 (2015) 
(mem.) (setting the case for hearing and postponing consideration of jurisdiction). 
 13. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
 14. See infra text accompanying notes 27-37. 
 15. See Levitt, supra note 5, at 152, 155-60; Justin Levitt, Shadowboxing and Unintended 
Consequences, SCOTUSBLOG (June 25, 2013, 10:39 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/ 
2013/06/shadowboxing-and-unintended-consequences/. 
 16. 135 S. Ct. 1257 (2015). 
 17. Id. at 1262-63. 
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necessary to satisfy the Act.18 The Court, reflecting the Act’s nuanced 
distinction between demographic aggregation and political efficacy, 
disagreed.19 Justice Kennedy, the lone Justice in the majority of both 
2013 and 2015 cases, appears to have refocused on reality. 
 Yet the path forward is not yet secure. The case above concerned a 
portion of the Voting Rights Act that is no longer in place.20 That is, 
the 2015 Alabama case involved the means by which 2011 Alabama 
legislators complied with a statutory provision invalidated in 2013 by 
a different case out of Alabama. Plaintiffs chose to litigate their case 
as confined to one now-defunct statutory provision in one state, and 
it may be similarly tempting for the Court to cabin its ruling in the 
cases to come. It is not clear whether the Court believed it was con-
fronting an anomaly of primarily historical significance. On the other 
hand, the Court may recognize that the approach of the Alabama leg-
islators is connected to an ongoing approach in several other states, 
and connected specifically by the common reliance on a Voting Rights 
Act that does not exist. If the Court focuses on the actual legislation 
at hand, it should be able to distinguish the real statute’s approach 
from that of its fictionalized retrograde cousin. Proper focus on local 
nuance and meaningful political power—as precedent demands—can 
restore the Voting Rights Act to a vehicle for fighting both racial dis-
crimination and racial essentialism. 
 This Article proceeds in three sections. Part II explains the Voting 
Rights Act and its constitutional context: the way that the real stat-
ute is designed to function. Part III then investigates the strange 
prominence in recent redistricting of a cartoon version of the Act that 
ignores the tailored nuance built into the statute. Part IV explains 
why the simulacrum is not merely wrong, but also dangerous: it may 
yield guidance for decision-makers that is more administrable, but it 
does so only at the cost of constitutionally impermissible essentialist 
assumptions. These shortcuts are both unlawful and unnecessary. 
II.   THE CONSTITUTION AND THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 
 The Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution’s Fourteenth 
Amendment to prevent government from treating people differently 
primarily based on their race without an especially good reason.21 In 
                                                                                                                  
 18. Id. at 1267, 1271; see also Brief for Appellees at 7, Ala. Legislative Black Caucus, 
135 S. Ct. 1257 (Nos. 13-895, 13-1138), 2014 WL 5202058, at *7 (“As a strategy to comply 
with Section 5, the drafters [of the 2011 district plan] decided to avoid reducing the black 
population of preexisting majority-black districts where possible.”). 
 19. Ala. Legislative Black Caucus, 135 S. Ct. at 1272-74. 
 20. See infra Part II, for a more complete description of the different portions of the 
Voting Rights Act, including section 5 of the Act, which was at issue in both Alabama 
Legislative Black Caucus and Shelby County. 
 21. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013). 
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1993, the Court made clear that this approach applied to certain 
forms of redistricting as well.22 More specifically, when race is the 
predominant and overriding reason for drawing either a plan as a 
whole or a particular district within that plan, that use of race must 
be narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest.23 The final 
caveat is important, but too often forgotten: a predominant focus on 
race in the drawing of districts is constitutionally suspect, not consti-
tutionally invalid. The difference between the two depends on a 
state’s good reason and nuanced execution: on ensuring that, as with 
other suspect classifications, a state is proceeding based on real need 
and not overbroad generalization or stereotype.24 
 In that precise space sits the Voting Rights Act.25 The Voting 
Rights Act of 1965, long lauded as perhaps the most successful ex-
ample of American civil rights legislation, is the signature product of 
Congress’s enumerated power to enforce the Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendments.26 Though the Court has never directly held that 
compliance with the VRA is a sufficient reason for a state to take di-
rect action on the basis of race, a parade of Justices have opined or 
presumed that it suffices.27 
 The privileged position of the Voting Rights Act is sensible. In two 
different provisions with substantial impact on redistricting, the VRA 
seeks to remedy past intentional discrimination and prevent present 
subordination where the risks of new or continued intentional dis-
crimination are greatest. 
A.   Section 5 
 The higher-profile provision is based on section 5 of the Act. It  
established a regime of preclearance, under which jurisdictions  
of particular concern may not enforce any election-related change  
unless permitted to do so either by a federal court or by the U.S.  
                                                                                                                  
 22. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642 (1993). 
 23. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916, 920 (1995). 
 24. Cf. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 549-50 (1996) (recounting some of the 
stereotypes at the heart of Virginia’s imposition of single-sex education at the Virginia 
Military Institute). 
 25. For a more thorough explanation of the Voting Rights Act’s substantive provisions 
and its interaction with the Constitution, see Justin Levitt, Democracy on the High Wire: 
Citizen Commission Implementation of the Voting Rights Act, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1041, 
1047-69 (2013); Levitt, supra note 5, at 170-73. 
 26. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; id. amend. XV, § 2. 
 27. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 475 n.12 (2006) 
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Breyer, J.); id. at 518-19 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Thomas, J., Alito, J., and 
Roberts, C.J.); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 990, 994 (1996) (O’Connor, J., concurring); 
Shaw, 509 U.S. at 653-54; King v. State Bd. of Elections, 979 F. Supp. 619, 621-22 (N.D. Ill. 
1997), aff’d, King v. Ill. Bd. of Elections, 522 U.S. 1087 (1998). 
580  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:573 
 
Department of Justice.28 In the 2011 cycle of redistricting, this  
regime primarily applied to those jurisdictions where racial discrimi-
nation caused radically low democratic participation in the 1960s and 
1970s and which had failed in the intervening years to demonstrate a 
record of minority engagement sufficiently improved to “bail out” of 
coverage.29 Preclearance also governed jurisdictions that had been 
“bailed in” to coverage by a federal court, after a specific finding of 
intentional discrimination.30 That is, the hallmark of the preclear-
ance regime is that it applied only to jurisdictions with an insuffi-
ciently attenuated connection to intentional discrimination. 
 The primary means by which jurisdictions were covered was  
a statutory provision with a sunset provision.31 Congress renewed 
coverage most recently in 2006,32 but in 2013, the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                  
 28. Technically, a jurisdiction subject to a preclearance requirement may seek a 
declaratory judgment from the federal court or may seek administrative preclearance from 
the Department of Justice. For jurisdictions choosing the administrative path, a decision is 
considered to be precleared if the Department of Justice fails to object within sixty days 
from the date of a complete submission. 52 U.S.C. § 10304(a) (Supp. II 2014). Any 
jurisdiction may seek a judicial declaratory judgment, whether the Department of Justice 
has objected or not. Id. 
 29. Id. § 10303. 
 30. Id. § 10302(c). Relatively few jurisdictions had ever been “bailed in” under this 
provision, in part because of the comparatively expansive primary coverage of the 
preclearance regime. During the last redistricting cycle, only the Village of Port Chester, 
New York; Charles Mix County, South Dakota; and Buffalo County, South Dakota were 
subject to preclearance requirements through bail-in. See Consent Decree, United States v. 
Vill. of Port Chester, No. 1:06-CV-15173 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2009); Consent Decree, 
Blackmoon v. Charles Mix Cty., No. 4:05-CV-04017 (D.S.D. Dec. 4, 2007); Consent Decree, 
Kirkie v. Buffalo Cty., No. 3:03-CV-03011, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30960 (D.S.D. Feb. 10, 
2004). Since then, courts have been asked to issue bail-in orders against several other 
jurisdictions, including Hawaii, North Carolina, and Texas; most such cases are  
still pending. See Complaint at 32, Akina v. Hawaii, No. 1:15-CV-00322 (D. Hawaii Aug. 
13, 2015), https://www.judicialwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/08-13-15-Akina-v-
Hawaii-race-based-voter-rolls-00322.pdf (Hawaii); Fourth Amended Complaint of  
Plaintiffs Texas Latino Redistricting Task Force, et al., at 20, Perez v. Perry, No.  
5:11-CV-00360 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2013), http://redistricting.lls.edu/files/TX/ 
20130909%20TXLRTF%20complaint.pdf (Texas); Complaint at 31, N.C. State Conference 
of the NAACP v. McCrory, No. 1:13-CV-00658 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 12, 2013), 2013 WL 4053231 
(North Carolina); Complaint at 49, Ga. State Conference of the NAACP v. Hancock Cty. 
Bd. of Elections & Registration, No. 5:15-CV-00414 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 3, 2015), 
https://lawyerscommittee.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Hancock-Co-Complaint.pdf 
(Hancock County, Ga.); Complaint at 11, Patino v. Pasadena, No. 4:14-CV-03241 (S.D. Tex. 
Nov. 12, 2014) (Pasadena, Tex.); Complaint at 22-23, Terrebonne Parish NAACP v.  
Jindal, No. 3:14-CV-00069 (M.D. La. Feb. 3, 2014), http://redistricting.lls.edu/files/ 
20140203%20Terrebonne%20Parish%20Complaint.PDF (Terrebonne Parish, La.); 
Complaint at 17, Petteway v. Galveston Cty., No. 3:13-CV-00308 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2013), 
http://redistricting.lls.edu/files/20130826%20petteway%20v%20galveston%20cnty%20complaint.
pdf (Galveston County, Tex.).  
 31. 52 U.S.C. § 10303(a)(8) (Supp. II 2014). 
 32. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, Coretta Scott King, César E. Chávez, Barbara C. 
Jordan, William C. Velásquez, and Dr. Hector P. Garcia Voting Rights Act Reauthorization 
and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577 (2006), amended by Pub. 
L. No. 110-258, 122 Stat. 2428 (2008). 
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struck down the 2006 coverage renewal, finding it to be insufficiently 
attuned to current conditions.33 Yet even without congressional action 
establishing a new coverage formula, the nature of the preclearance 
standard remains of continuing interest and relevance for three rea-
sons. First, districts that were drawn in 2011 pursuant to preclear-
ance are only lawful, today, if they did not unduly depend on race—
and that assessment is predicated on a proper interpretation of what 
the Voting Rights Act then required. Second, the potential for judicial 
bail-in—with several cases pending, for states and for municipali-
ties34—means that future districts may well be held to the standard 
of the preclearance regime once again. And third, the nuanced and 
non-essentialist nature of the substantive criteria for preclearance 
reflects the nuanced and non-essentialist nature of the Voting Rights 
Act as a whole. 
 Preclearance rests on two substantive standards.35 First, jurisdic-
tions have to prove that an electoral change was not motivated by the 
intent to discriminate.36 Second, jurisdictions have to prove that an 
electoral change would not have the effect of denying or abridging the 
right to vote on account of race or language minority status.37 This 
latter effects-based standard has been interpreted by the Supreme 
Court to mean that a proposed election-related change may not be 
precleared if it leaves a community of minority voters worse off with 
respect to their “effective exercise of the electoral franchise” than 
they had been under the prior policy.38 The standard is known as 
“retrogression.”39  
 At the start of the 2011 redistricting cycle, there were several am-
biguities in the retrogression standard. They persisted in part be-
cause redistricting is generally decennial, judicial preclearance is a 
rarity, and the combination gives courts few opportunities to 
                                                                                                                  
 33. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2630-31 (2013).  
 34. See supra note 30. 
 35. The current standards are also those that governed the 2011 redistricting cycle. 
 36. 52 U.S.C. § 10304(a), (c) (Supp. II 2014).  
 37. Id. § 10304(a). 
 38. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976). In truth, it is a misnomer to refer 
to this prong of the retrogression inquiry as a standard that is purely effects-based. The 
preclearance requirement is only imposed in jurisdictions with a lingering, unrebutted 
connection to intentional discrimination. So the “effects” prong of section 5 is really an 
inquiry into the effect of an electoral change only in the context of a history of intentional 
discrimination that continues to impact the present. 
 39. Id.  
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construe the governing statute.40 For purposes of this Article, two 
ambiguities are most significant. Both relate to a statutory “clarifica-
tion” made by Congress in 2006. 
 Three years earlier, in a case known as Georgia v. Ashcroft,41 the 
Supreme Court had construed section 5 in a way permitting covered 
jurisdictions to trade minority voters’ control of a few districts for 
minority influence over, but not control of, a larger area.42 Congress 
responded by amending the statute to specify that any change dimin-
ishing—on account of race or language minority status—the ability of 
a community to elect their preferred candidates of choice would 
amount to an unlawful abridgement.43 The amendment made it clear 
that a covered jurisdiction could not take a district in which a minori-
ty community had the demonstrated ability to elect their preferred 
candidates of choice and reconfigure the district in such a way as to 
remove that ability. Under the 2006 amendment, a minority commu-
nity in a polarized region with the ability to elect candidates of choice 
in three districts would be the victim of retrogression if redistricting 
left that community with the ability to elect candidates in only two 
districts thereafter. 
 That statutory clarification left (at least) two ambiguities.44 First, 
the statute does not expressly state whether a diminution in the abil-
ity to elect is to be measured within a particular district, as well as in 
the total number of districts yielding reliable minority electoral pow-
er. If a minority community in a covered jurisdiction has the reliable 
ability to elect candidates of choice within a given district by over-
whelming margins, might the statute bar any plan reducing the like-
ly margin of victory in that district, even if the plan leaves the minor-
ity community still reliably in control of the election outcome? 
 On its face, the statute does not appear to provide a clear answer. 
But understanding the text as a reaction to Georgia v. Ashcroft 
provides a clue. In that case, the Court discussed two different ways 
of preserving a minority community’s ability to elect candidates of 
choice. One involves a “certain number of ‘safe’ districts, in which it 
is highly likely that minority voters will be able to elect the candidate 
of their choice,” and one involves “a greater number of districts in 
                                                                                                                  
 40. See Levitt, supra note 25, at 1063. Indeed, thirty-eight years after the enactment 
of a provision prohibiting diminishment of the effective exercise of the electoral franchise, 
the Court explained that “we have never determined the meaning of ‘effective exercise of 
the electoral franchise.’ ” Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 479 (2003). 
 41. 539 U.S. at 461. 
 42. Id. at 481-84. 
 43. 52 U.S.C. § 10304(b) (Supp. II 2014).  
 44. For a thorough treatment of the many ambiguities in the retrogression standard, 
see Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117 YALE 
L.J. 174, 216-51 (2007). 
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which it is likely—although perhaps not quite as likely as under the 
benchmark plan—that minority voters will be able to elect 
candidates of their choice.”45 The Court distinguished both of those 
options from two other indicia of electoral success: drawing influence 
districts, “where minority voters may not be able to elect a candidate 
of choice but can play a substantial, if not decisive, role in the 
electoral process,”46 and maintaining leadership positions within the 
legislature for representatives of districts with large minority 
communities, without an opportunity for the minority voters to 
exercise meaningful electoral control.47 The Court characterized these 
influence districts and positions of legislative leadership as 
alternative means of assessing electoral power, factors “in addition to 
the comparative ability of a minority group to elect a candidate of  
its choice.”48  
 By focusing its 2006 statutory amendment on a community’s 
ability to elect, Congress manifested its intent to prevent these third 
and fourth options from supplanting the first two: drawing influence 
districts or maintaining leadership positions for particular 
representatives is not a permissible substitute for districts in which 
the minority community could reliably elect candidates of choice.49 
But because either of the Court’s first two options preserve the 
community’s ability to elect candidates of choice, it appears that 
either would satisfy the retrogression inquiry Congress established—
and that jurisdictions might plausibly choose between them without 
retrogressing. As long as a minority community with a reliable 
ability to elect candidates of choice in a district retains that reliable 
ability, the better reading of the statute is that there is no 
retrogression, even if the community’s precise electoral strength 
within the district varies.50 In guidance published for the 2011 
redistricting cycle, the Department of Justice agreed.51 And in 2015, 
the Supreme Court concurred.52  
                                                                                                                  
 45. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 480. The Court made clear that “[s]ection 5 does not dictate 
that a State must pick one of these methods of redistricting over another.” Id. 
 46. Id. at 482. 
 47. Id. at 483-84. 
 48. Id. at 482 (emphasis added). 
 49. See Persily, supra note 44, at 236. 
 50. This result, further, is in keeping with the Act’s contextual approach to electoral 
power. The alternative conceives of retrogression as requiring the maintenance of a specific 
margin of victory within a given district. Such a standard could lead perversely both to 
reduced minority electoral power and reduced opportunities to break down historical 
polarization patterns, as overpacked “safe” districts locked in by the statute leach minority 
voters from surrounding areas. 
 51. See Guidance Concerning Redistricting Under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 
76 Fed. Reg. 7470, 7471 (Feb. 9, 2011) (“In analyzing redistricting plans, the Department 
will follow the congressional directive of ensuring that the ability of such citizens to elect 
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 A second ambiguity has not been clarified either by the Depart-
ment of Justice or the Court. The statute is written in one direction: 
as noted above, in direct response to Georgia v. Ashcroft, it specifies 
that diminishing a minority community’s ability to elect candidates 
of choice in a covered jurisdiction is to be considered unlawful  
retrogression.53 The statute does not state, however, that this is the 
only conduct that may constitute retrogression. It may well be that a 
diminution in the effective exercise of the franchise even without an 
impairment of a pre-existing ability to elect is also retrogressive.54 
 Even with unresolved issues like those above, what is not ambigu-
ous is the relentlessly pragmatic approach of a proper retrogression 
inquiry. The 2006 amendments to the Voting Rights Act did not over-
turn the Supreme Court’s understanding that assessing the effective 
exercise of the electoral franchise—and those policies that could  
diminish it—is an exercise focused on real political power and not 
merely simplistic math. That is true whether the inquiry depends on 
an ability to elect candidates of choice, or the effective exercise of the 
franchise absent that ability. Retrogression is highly dependent  
on local circumstances and context, including comparative levels of 
voter registration, turnout, and polarization.55 “ ‘No single statistic 
provides courts with a shortcut to determine whether’ a voting 
change retrogresses from the benchmark.”56 The tally of voting-age 
citizens within a district by race or language minority status does not 
alone reveal whether the community has suffered a meaningful dim-
inution in the effective exercise of the franchise.57 
                                                                                                                  
their preferred candidates of choice is protected. That ability to elect either exists or it does 
not in any particular circumstance.”). 
 52. Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1273 (2015). 
 53. 52 U.S.C. § 10304(b) (Supp. II 2014). 
 54. See Levitt, supra note 25, at 1062; cf. Persily, supra note 44, at 243-45 (discussing 
this possibility, but imagining it as a diminution in a partial “ability to elect,” or a relative 
“ability to elect” that does not amount to the realistic ability to elect a candidate in a 
district). The Department of Justice’s position on this ambiguity is itself ambiguous. The 
Department has said that, given a pre-existing ability to elect, it “will follow the 
congressional directive of ensuring that the ability of such citizens to elect their preferred 
candidates of choice is protected. That ability to elect either exists or it does not in any 
particular circumstance.” See Guidance Concerning Redistricting Under Section 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act, 76 Fed. Reg. at 7471. This affirmation does not indicate whether the 
Department believes that there may be a statutorily cognizable diminution in the effective 
exercise of the franchise even when a district had not previously allowed racial or language 
minorities the ability to elect candidates of choice.  
 55. See Persily, supra note 44, at 242. 
 56. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 480 (2003) (quoting Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 
U.S. 997, 1020-21 (1994)); cf. infra text accompanying note 79. 
 57. Cf. In re Senate Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment 1176, 83 So. 3d 
597, 626-27 (Fla. 2012) (construing the Florida state constitution’s retrogression provision 
and concluding that “[b]ecause a minority group’s ability to elect a candidate of choice 
depends upon more than just population figures, we reject any argument that the minority 
population percentage in each district as of 2002 is somehow fixed to an absolute number 
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 The courts’ focus on the pragmatic impact of a change on the 
ground in assessing retrogression is entirely consistent with the long-
time approach of the Department of Justice.58 DOJ Guidance on ret-
rogression in the redistricting context had consistently emphasized 
the nuanced, contextual assessment of changes to the functional ex-
ercise of the franchise: 
In determining whether the ability to elect exists in the bench-
mark plan and whether it continues in the proposed plan, the  
Attorney General does not rely on any predetermined or fixed  
demographic percentages at any point in the assessment. Rather, 
in the Department's view, this determination requires a functional 
analysis of the electoral behavior within the particular jurisdiction 
or election district. As noted above, census data alone may not pro-
vide sufficient indicia of electoral behavior to make the requisite 
determination. Circumstances, such as differing rates of electoral 
participation within discrete portions of a population, may  
impact . . . the ability of voters to elect candidates of choice, even if 
the overall demographic data show no significant change.59 
A federal court noted that this guidance, promulgated in 2011, is in 
this respect “consistent with the guidance DOJ has been issuing to 
assess retrogressive effect for the past two decades.”60 
 This is all in keeping with the preclearance regime’s careful 
avoidance of racial essentialism and stereotype. In establishing the 
jurisdictions to be covered by the preclearance requirement, the stat-
ute provided a mechanism for bailout and bail-in, so that jurisdic-
tions that no longer warranted especially close review could be 
dropped from the regime and those where a closer look was justified 
could be added.61 And in establishing the conditions for retrogres-
sion—the conditions warranting a substantive objection if there is no 
indication that a given change was enacted with impermissible in-
tent—the statute demands review of whether and how minority 
communities actually effectuate electoral power, locality by locality. 
Relying on census data to determine retrogression would require as-
                                                                                                                  
under Florida’s minority protection provision. To hold otherwise would run the risk of 
permitting the Legislature to engage in racial gerrymandering to avoid diminishment.”). 
 58. The vast majority of changes in covered jurisdictions were reviewed by the DOJ 
and not the courts, and so for the life of the Voting Rights Act, the DOJ had been primarily 
responsible for evaluating retrogression. 
 59. Guidance Concerning Redistricting Under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 76 
Fed. Reg. at 7471; see also id. at 7471-72 (reviewing additional factors). 
The DOJ guidance, itself based upon a judicial demand for nuance and context, has in 
turn been cited approvingly by the courts. See, e.g., Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. 
Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1272 (2015). 
 60. Texas v. United States, 831 F. Supp. 2d 244, 265 (D.D.C. 2011), vacated on other 
grounds by 133 S. Ct. 2885 (2013) (mem.); see also id. at 265 n.26. 
 61. 52 U.S.C. §§ 10302(c), 10303(a) (Supp. II 2014). 
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sumptions about the voting patterns of racial or ethnic groups based 
on nothing other than those voters’ race or ethnicity. The courts and 
the administrative agency tasked with preventing retrogression 
make no such assumptions, and do not indulge them when made by 
jurisdictions drawing the lines.  
B.   Section 2  
 The other provision of the Voting Rights Act with primary impact 
on redistricting is commonly known as “section 2,” and it shares the 
same nuanced, functional approach and aversion to essentialism. 
Section 2 applies nationwide, preventing the inequitable dilution of 
minority communities’ voting power where alternative districts 
might otherwise allow minorities to maintain an effective opportuni-
ty to elect candidates of choice.62 That is, where section 5 measures 
dilution by looking to changes from past practice, section 2 measures 
dilution against hypothetical alternatives. 
 Section 2 establishes a threshold to test where district lines  
might be responsible for depriving a minority community of the equal  
opportunity for electoral success. To invoke the statute, minority 
communities must be sufficiently large and sufficiently cohesive  
to provide a meaningful opportunity to elect candidates, and the  
remainder of the surrounding electorate must be sufficiently polar-
ized to consistently defeat minority voters in the area.63 The first 
component tests whether minorities would have meaningful oppor-
tunity if the lines were appropriately drawn;64 the second tests 
whether minorities would be deprived of that opportunity if the lines 
were drawn without solicitude.65  
 Still, not every lost opportunity amounts to a violation of section 2: 
the statute further instructs that dilution is to be tested in “the total-
ity of circumstances.”66 Courts have consistently analyzed this totali-
ty through the lens of the “Senate factors”: factors listed in the Sen-
ate Judiciary report accompanying the amendment of the Voting 
Rights Act in 1982.67 These Senate factors include elements like a 
history of official discrimination in voting or in other areas that affect 
the voting process, or troublesome signs of current discriminatory 
                                                                                                                  
 62. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b). 
 63. Collectively, these threshold elements are known as “Gingles conditions,” after the 
case establishing them. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986). 
 64. Id. at 50.  
 65. See id. at 51.   
 66. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b). 
 67. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28-29 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 205-06; 
accord Gingles, 478 U.S. at 44-45. 
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attitudes.68 In general, they amount to “danger signs” of enhanced 
risk that either intentional discrimination on the basis of race or  
language minority status, or the legacy of such discrimination, is  
interacting with the placement of districts to fuel the deprivation of 
minority opportunity.69  
 This test for liability is designed to render equitable opportunity 
for minority communities without indulging in essentialism. A racial 
or ethnic minority’s electoral (and geographic or sociocultural)70 cohe-
                                                                                                                  
 68. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 44-45. In addition to the Senate factors, courts will also 
consider in the totality of circumstances the degree to which minority communities have 
achieved rough proportionality of control jurisdiction-wide. League of United Latin Am. 
Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 437 (2006); Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1013-15 
(1994); Gingles, 478 U.S. at 77 (opinion of Brennan, J.). While lack of proportionality is not 
generally a reason to find liability, proportionality may be a reason to deny it: courts have 
been reluctant to find that minority voters are denied equal electoral opportunity when 
those voters reliably control districts “in substantial proportion to the minority’s share of 
voting-age population.” De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1013.  
 69. Section 2, as we know it, is also the product of a disagreement between Congress 
and the Supreme Court. In 1980, the Court construed then-existing text of section 2 to 
precisely mirror constitutional prohibitions on racial discrimination, preventing the 
drawing of district lines only upon sufficient proof of discriminatory intent. City of Mobile 
v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 60-61 (1980) (plurality opinion). This set a rather high evidentiary 
bar, and when Congress amended the Voting Rights Act in 1982, it clearly intended to 
afford relief from dilutive practices without requiring plaintiffs to offer the same degree of 
proof present in a constitutional claim of discriminatory intent. See Voting Rights Act 
Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131 (1982) (changing  
“No . . . procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny 
or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color” to 
“No . . . procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a 
manner which results in a denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen of the United 
States to vote on account of race or color,” and defining the violation in terms of the totality 
of circumstances) (emphasis added); see also S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 27 (“The amendment to 
the language of Section 2 is designed to make clear that plaintiffs need not prove a 
discriminatory purpose in the adoption or maintenance of the challenged system of practice 
in order to establish a violation.”).  
As a consequence, section 2 as amended has often been referred to as an “effects test” or 
a “results test.” See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 35. Like the identification of section 5 
retrogression as an “effects test,” see supra note 38, the section 2 shorthand is an 
unfortunate misnomer, see United States v. Blaine Cty., 363 F.3d 897, 909 (9th Cir. 2004), 
because it may imply that section 2 prohibits practices with merely a disparate impact on 
minority voters. Section 2 has not been construed in such a manner. See Smith v. Salt 
River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 109 F.3d 586, 595 (9th Cir. 1997). 
Instead, and based largely on the demand for an examination of the totality of the 
circumstances in order to find dilution, courts have generally insisted on some sort of tie to 
intentional discrimination, past or present, or the enhanced risk of such discrimination. 
See Christopher S. Elmendorf & Douglas M. Spencer, Administering Section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act After Shelby County, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2143, 2163-68 (2015) (reviewing 
courts’ varying interpretations of the totality of circumstances and concluding that though 
courts may differ in the particulars, all seem to require some sort of tie to intentional 
discrimination). 
 70. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 548 U.S. at 435 (“We emphasize it is the 
enormous geographical distance separating the Austin and Mexican-border communities, 
coupled with the disparate needs and interests of these populations—not either factor 
alone—that renders District 25 noncompact for § 2 purposes. The mathematical possibility 
of a racial bloc does not make a district compact.”). 
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sion must be proven, not assumed.71 A racial or ethnic majority’s  
cohesion must be proven, not assumed.72 The consistent tendency of 
the majority to defeat candidates preferred by the minority in the 
absence of appropriate race-conscious relief must be proven, not  
assumed.73 The presence of enhanced risk that intentional discrimi-
nation has played a role in rendering opportunity unequal must  
be proven, not assumed.74 All of these factors must be proven in the 
context of local politics, without importing assumptions from national 
trends.75 Demographics alone—numerical tallies of voting-age citi-
zens of a particular race or ethnicity—are insufficient to establish 
any one of these elements, much less the conditions for overall liabil-
ity. As with section 5, section 2 resists back-of-the-envelope demo-
graphic simplification.76 The establishment of a violation depends 
                                                                                                                  
 71. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920 (1995) (emphasizing that a 
jurisdiction may not “assume[] from a group of voters’ race that they ‘think alike, share the 
same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls’ . . . .” (quoting 
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993))). 
 72. See id. 
 73. See, e.g., Kareem U. Crayton, Sword, Shield, and Compass: The Uses and Misuses 
of Racially Polarized Voting Studies in Voting Rights Enforcement, 64 RUTGERS L. REV. 
973, 989 (2012) (noting that the threshold Gingles conditions “call for evidence that race 
largely drives election choices and outcomes in the challenged jurisdiction”) (emphasis 
added); see also Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50-51 (listing the Gingles conditions).  
 74. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 79. 
 75. See Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 41-42 (1993). 
 76. The final clause of section 2—which I call the “proportionality proviso”—
represents yet another way in which the statute stands against racial essentialism. The 
final sentence states that in establishing vote dilution based on the totality of the 
circumstances,  
[t]he extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in 
the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: 
Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a 
protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population. 
52 U.S.C. § 10301(b) (Supp. II 2014). 
This clause is apparently much misunderstood. Some Justices have apparently believed 
it to mean that section 2 of the Voting Rights Act does not establish a right of minority 
citizens to proportional representation of their interests. See, e.g., Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 
874, 927 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 956 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting); Gingles, 478 U.S. at 84 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). But,  
[b]y its terms, this language addresses the number of minorities elected to 
office, not the number of districts in which minorities constitute a voting 
majority. These two things are not synonymous, and it would be an affront to 
our constitutional traditions to treat them as such. The assumption that 
majority-minority districts elect only minority representatives, or that 
majority-white districts elect only white representatives, is false as an 
empirical matter. 
Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1027 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment).  
That is, the actual text of the proportionality proviso is less a strike against 
proportionality than a strike against essentialism. Congress did not wish to indulge the 
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“upon a searching practical evaluation of the ‘past and present reali-
ty,’ ”77 connected to “ ‘an intensely local appraisal of the design and 
impact’ of the contested electoral mechanisms.”78 “No single statistic 
provides courts with a shortcut to determine whether a set of single-
member districts unlawfully dilutes minority voting strength.”79 
 Indeed, demographic shortcuts are authorized in only one aspect 
of section 2: the requirement, as a condition of proving dilution under 
an unfavorable districting scheme, that plaintiffs show that cohesive 
minorities form a sufficiently large portion of a district-sized popula-
tion to exercise control if the lines were favorably drawn.80 For years, 
groups of minority citizens had argued that they had functional polit-
ical control of a district-sized population even without comprising at 
least 50% of that population, and the Court had repeatedly assumed 
without deciding that such control might suffice in meeting the 
threshold condition.81 In 2009, the Court confronted the issue direct-
ly, and a plurality determined in Bartlett v. Strickland that section 2 
is unavailable to a minority community comprising less than 50% of a 
district-sized electorate.82 
 The decision was premised in part on one theoretical approach to 
dilution. The plurality reasoned that dilution of a minority communi-
ty’s opportunity to elect candidates on account of race or language 
minority status had to be assessed based on the potential power of 
the minority community alone.83 It was premised in part on a desire 
to improve the judicial administration of cases,84 and in part on a 
perceived need to limit the potential circumstances in which jurisdic-
tions devoted primary attention to considerations of race.85 
 It is crucial to recognize, however, that Bartlett’s 50.1% threshold 
affects only the predicate conditions for plaintiffs seeking section 2 
                                                                                                                  
unwarranted assumption that an equal opportunity for cohesive groups of minority citizens 
would yield a proportional number of minority legislators, or that the lack of the former 
could be proven by the lack of the latter, when minority voters might well prefer candidates 
of different races. 
 77. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 79 (quoting S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 30 (1982), reprinted in 
1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 208). 
 78. Id. (quoting Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 622 (1982)). 
 79. De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1020-21. 
 80. This is generally known as a piece of the first “Gingles condition.” See Gingles, 478 
U.S. at 50-51. 
 81. See cases cited in Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 12 (2009) (plurality opinion). 
 82. Id. at 18-19. 
 83. Id. at 15. 
 84. Id. at 17-18. 
 85. Id. at 21-22 (noting that a contrary interpretation “would result in a substantial 
increase in the number of mandatory districts drawn with race as the ‘predominant factor 
motivating the legislature’s decision.’ ” (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 
(1995))). 
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relief and attempting to establish liability. The Court did not deter-
mine that the same demographic shorthand was appropriate for con-
structing a remedy once vote dilution is established, or for a state to 
use as an automatic rule in drawing districts to preempt section 2 
concerns.  
 A remedial rule pegging districts drawn to satisfy section 2 at a 
50.1% minority electorate may seem a mirror image of Bartlett—but 
it is actually not an equivalent. That is because the strict demograph-
ic threshold in Bartlett adopts a preference for administrability, but 
only when doing so entails no essentialism by the state. Put different-
ly, a rule requiring 50.1% for liability purposes does not depend on 
assuming that minority or majority community members all have the 
same political interests. From the government jurisdiction’s perspec-
tive, the 50.1% demographic threshold merely alerts decision-makers 
that they should inquire further into the need to consider race: it sig-
nals a potential issue. And from the perspective of minority commu-
nities, the 50.1% threshold cuts off some otherwise valid claims that 
minority communities have been deprived of control. A 50.1% thresh-
old, as one component of an initial screen for viable cases, serves a 
signaling and gatekeeping function. But after Bartlett, liability under 
the Voting Rights Act still depends on the local electoral nuances of 
minority engagement, just as it did before.86 There remains no toler-
ance for essentialist assumptions in establishing a valid claim.  
 The same cannot be said for a presumptive 50.1% majority-
minority remedy (or worse, drawing districts at 50.1% to preempt 
section 2 concerns, without any attention to whether liability is plau-
sible). Section 2 liability depends on evidence that a minority com-
munity has been inequitably deprived of an effective opportunity to 
elect candidates of choice. Consequently, a remedy must ensure that 
the electoral laws give that minority community a meaningfully ef-
fective opportunity to elect its preferred representatives. Creating 
such an opportunity, by drawing districts or otherwise, may involve 
state action based primarily on race, which demands contextualized 
nuance and precision: real facts about real political patterns. The 
Court has recognized this need, acknowledging that “it may be possi-
ble for a citizen voting-age majority to lack real electoral opportuni-
ty.”87 Conversely, it may be possible for a demographic minority in a 
jurisdiction with modest crossover voting to have real electoral oppor-
tunity. Assuming that a 50% minority district provides an effective 
remedy—or, from a preemptive point of view, assuming that a 50% 
minority district is necessary to do the job—involves state action en-
gaging essentialist assumptions about how minority and majority 
                                                                                                                  
 86. See id. at 39-40 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 87. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 428 (2006). 
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electors will vote based on race or language minority status alone.88 
The Voting Rights Act is designed to avoid, not impose, such  
shorthand. 
III.   DEMOGRAPHIC DETERMINISM AND RACIAL ESSENTIALISM  
IN THIS REDISTRICTING CYCLE 
 The analysis above reveals that the Voting Rights Act sets a  
performance standard, not a design standard.89 Under certain condi-
tions (and only under those conditions), it demands districts that  
actually function to grant or protect political power, and not merely 
districts that evidence a rigid set of features ticked off of a checklist. 
This focus on actual function is what makes the statute not only con-
stitutionally viable but appropriately malleable for different contexts 
in different spaces and times.  
 In this redistricting cycle, several jurisdictions seem to have cast 
aside the Voting Rights Act’s careful tailoring to local political condi-
tions and aversion to racial essentialism. Instead, these jurisdictions 
seem to have relied on ham-handed demographic targets—a belief, 
real or professed, that the Voting Rights Act simply requires hitting  
a predetermined percentage of minorities in a predetermined number 
of districts. These jurisdictions deliberately sought to maintain  
supermajority quotas of minority voting-age or citizen voting-age 
population ostensibly to avoid retrogression, or to peg districts at  
a 50% minority-voter threshold ostensibly to satisfy section 2, with-
out the searching local electoral analysis required to determine if 
those targets were statutorily necessary or sufficient. According to 
this cartoon version of compliance, all a redistricting entity needed to 
know was that District A had to be 72% black in 2011 because it was 
72% black in 2010 or 2001, or that District B needed to be 50% Lati-
no because a lot of Latinos lived in the area.90 That shorthand gloss 
on the Voting Rights Act’s obligations may represent a view perva-
sive in the social circles of legislators and their consultants, but it 
does not do justice to the design of the statute on the books.  
                                                                                                                  
 88. Indeed, a district pegged at 50% based on demographics alone assumes either that 
the minority and majority electorates are perfectly cohesive—that, for example, black or 
Latino citizens universally vote for one type of candidate, whites for another—or that they 
are not cohesive to exactly the same degree. Real analysis of electoral patterns may 
confirm or refute these suppositions: the point is only that the suppositions cannot stand 
on their own. 
 89. See generally, e.g., Cary Coglianese et al., Performance-Based Regulation: 
Prospects and Limitations in Health, Safety, and Environmental Protection, 55 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 705, 709 (2003) (clarifying the difference).  
 90. See, e.g., Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 903-06 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (articulating the approach of the simulacrum). 
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A.   Alabama 
 In Alabama, the state’s wooden reliance on demographics when 
purportedly attempting to satisfy its obligations under the Voting 
Rights Act was most visible in the context of preclearance and section 
5. As the federal court that reviewed the state’s most recent redis-
tricting noted, those drawing the lines did so with the design to  
ensure, as a preclearance strategy, that “the new majority-black  
districts should reflect as closely as possible the percentage of black 
voters in the existing majority-black districts as of the 2010  
Census.”91 That is, when redrawing the lines, the state attempted  
to “maintain roughly the same black population percentage in exist-
ing majority-minority districts.”92 Simple percentages—which the  
Supreme Court framed as “mechanical racial targets”93 and which the 
trial court’s dissenting judge characterized as a “district-specific  
racial quota”94—were repeatedly equated with the population’s ability 
to elect.95  
                                                                                                                  
 91. Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1247 (M.D. Ala. 
2013) (three-judge court); see also id. at 1276 (“[T]he Committee tried to match the 
percentages of the total black population in majority-black districts to the percentages in 
the 2001 districts based on the 2010 Census numbers.”); id. at 1297 (“To avoid a potential 
violation of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, [the map-drawing consultant] also added 
enough contiguous black populations to maintain the same relative percentages of black 
populations in the majority-black districts.”); id. at 1310 (“The Legislature preserved, 
where feasible, the existing majority-black districts and maintained the relative 
percentages of black voters in those majority-black districts. . . . Using the 2010 Census 
data, the percentages of the black voting-age populations in the majority-black districts 
under the Acts remain relatively constant when compared to the 2001 plans.”). 
 92. Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1263 (2015); see also 
id. at 1271. 
 93. Id. at 1267. 
 94. Ala. Legislative Black Caucus, 989 F. Supp. 2d at 1314 (Thompson, J., dissenting). 
 95. The trial court’s dissent quotes the deposition of one of the co-chairs of the 
Redistricting Committee, focusing rigidly on total population as the (sole) measure of 
retrogression within a district: 
Q. So you did not want the total population of African–Americans to drop in 
[SD 23]? 
A. That’s correct. 
Q. Okay. And if that population dropped a percentage, in your opinion that 
would have been retrogression? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. So if—And I’m not saying these are the numbers, but I’m just saying if 
Senator Sanders’ district had been 65 percent African–American, if it dropped 
to 62 percent African–American in total population, then that would have been 
retrogression to you? 
A. In my opinion, yes. 
Q. And so that’s what you were trying to prevent? 
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 It is therefore no surprise that lines were moved (and precincts 
split) accordingly, to capture minority voters that could meet the tar-
gets. There was no mention of any legislative investigation of cohe-
sion or political efficacy to conclude that the percentages targeted 
were in fact necessary to abide by Voting Rights Act requirements. 
There was no attempt, that is, to discern whether maintaining demo-
graphic consistency was necessary to maintain political efficacy.96  
 This appears to be consistent with past practice, if not legal obli-
gation: the federal trial court reviewing Alabama’s 2012 redistricting 
noted that “[i]n 2001, the Democrat-controlled Legislature repopulat-
ed the majority-black districts by shifting thousands of black people 
into those districts to maintain the same relative percentages of the 
black population in those districts.”97 Indeed, the court’s frequent and 
prominent citation of allegedly similar behavior welcomed by the liti-
gation plaintiffs ten years earlier, in a different partisan direction, 
implies that two legal wrongs can make a right.98 In truth, the pres-
ence of unjustified dependence on demographics in an earlier cycle 
does not provide a legal safe harbor for unjustified dependence on 
demographics now. 
 The Supreme Court thought the redistricting controversy in Ala-
bama to be one of the rare direct appeals worth oral argument time.99 
Its ruling, issued in March 2015, sharply corrected the court below—
and, by extension, the state’s essentialist practice.100 The Court dis-
tinguished the Act’s nuanced consideration of race from its cartoon 
counterpart, though without describing the alternatives as such:  
In our view, however, [a holding permitting the redrawing based 
on consideration of percentages alone] rests upon a misperception 
of the law. Section 5, which covered particular States and certain 
                                                                                                                  
A. Yes. 
Id. at 1324 (Thompson, J., dissenting). 
The trial court majority, it appears, made the same mistake. See id. at 1310 (“[T]he 
Alabama Legislature correctly concluded . . . that it could not significantly reduce the 
percentages of black voters in the majority-black districts because to do so would be to 
diminish black voters’ ability to elect their preferred candidates.”). 
 96. There was some evidence that two African-American incumbents requested, 
during the redistricting process, that their districts be drawn with at least 62% African-
American population. Id. at 1246. But there is little indication that the requests were made 
because a 62% African-American population threshold is necessary in those areas, in light 
of local mobilization and political cleavages, to afford an equal ability for the minority 
community to elect candidates of choice—rather than because a 62% African-American 
population would amount to comfortable political safety for the incumbents. 
 97. Id. at 1242 (emphasis added). 
 98. See, e.g., id. at 1301-02; id. at 1302 (“We refuse to apply a double standard that 
requires the Legislature to follow one set of rules for redistricting when Democrats control 
the Legislature and another set of rules when Republicans control it.”). 
 99. Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 2695 (2014). 
 100. See Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1273 (2015). 
594  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:573 
 
other jurisdictions, does not require a covered jurisdiction to main-
tain a particular numerical minority percentage. It requires the ju-
risdiction to maintain a minority’s ability to elect a preferred can-
didate of choice.101  
 Though the Court’s result was entirely consistent with the account 
of the Voting Rights Act developed above, it offered little theory  
explaining the outcome. The Court rested instead on section 5’s tex-
tual touchstone of the “ability to elect” and Department of Justice 
guidelines interpreting this text in a similar fashion.102 The text alone 
makes the Court’s decision correct, but not inevitable. A deeper theo-
ry is needed to explain why the Court’s approach is superior to the 
alternatives. As the analysis above reveals, the Court’s choice to con-
strue section 5 as it did is faithful not only to the statutory text but 
also to the non-essentialist thrust of section 5 as a whole—and to the 
constitutional commands that give it life. 
 Indeed, though the Court made no mention of jurisdictions beyond 
Alabama or statutory provisions beyond section 5, its firm ratifica-
tion of a retrogression standard embracing a nuanced view of the 
Voting Rights Act has implications for other states and other battles 
still working their way through the courts. The remainder of this 
Part briefly reviews some of the other states replicating, in different 
contexts, the same mistaken dependence on simple demographics 
that afflicted Alabama’s misreading of the Voting Rights Act. 
B.   California 
 In some states, those drawing the lines relied exclusively on  
demographics to assess Voting Rights Act compliance despite the 
contrary warnings of counsel.103 In California, however, where a new 
independent citizens’ commission was tasked with drawing congres-
sional and state legislative lines, counsel seems to have provoked the 
exclusive emphasis on demographics.104 This position of legal advisor 
was so important that initiative proponents embedded in the govern-
ing statute a requirement that at least one counsel to the commission 
be chosen based on “demonstrated extensive experience and expertise 
                                                                                                                  
 101. Id. at 1272. 
 102. See supra text accompanying notes 59-60; see also Ala. Legislative Black Caucus, 
135 S. Ct.  at 1272-73. The Court ominously mentioned that “Alabama’s mechanical 
interpretation of § 5 can raise serious constitutional concerns,” but did so without any 
further elaboration. Id. at 1273. 
 103. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 133-42 (discussing the redrawing of 
district lines in Texas in spite of contrary legal advice). 
 104. Some commissioners apparently sought to consider more pragmatic indicators of 
minority communities’ voting power, but it is unclear whether those commissioners ever 
received the data necessary to make relevant informed decisions. Levitt, supra note 25,  
at 1091. 
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in implementation and enforcement of the federal Voting Rights  
Act of 1965.”105 And yet, at least in meetings open to the public, the 
counsel selected consistently assessed minority populations’ electoral 
opportunities in purely demographic terms, against the prevailing 
interpretation of the Department of Justice.106 
C.   Florida 
 Florida’s state constitution contains provisions, newly enacted  
in 2010, that mirror the substantive protections of the Voting Rights 
Act: “[D]istricts shall not be drawn with the intent or result of deny-
ing or abridging the equal opportunity of racial or language minori-
ties to participate in the political process or to diminish their ability 
to elect representatives of their choice[.]”107 The Florida Supreme 
Court has construed these provisions to provide the same functional 
protections for electoral power—dependent not merely on de-
mographics, but on real political circumstances on the ground—as 
their federal counterparts.108 
 In practice, part of Florida’s process appeared to live up to this 
standard, and part did not. The Florida Supreme Court praised the 
state House for its attention to factors beyond demographics alone in 
designing districts to preserve minority political opportunities.109 The 
                                                                                                                  
 105. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8253(a)(5) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 291 of 2015 Reg. Sess.). 
 106. See, e.g., Transcript at 21, Full Comm’n Line-Drawing Meeting (Cal. Citizens 
Redistricting Comm’n, June 1, 2011), http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/downloads/transcripts/ 
201106/transcripts_20110601_sacto_vol1.pdf (“If I understand the question correctly, it is -- 
better to restate it, it would be is there a percentage population that is lower than what is 
needed to have an ability to elect, so that effectively you don’t need to worry about a 
reduction in that percentage in a new district? So, first, I want to clarify that the term 
“ability to elect” is a term of art in Voting Rights Act cases, and it really references a 50 
percent plus majority.”); id. at 26 (“So, the easy choice is always maintain the percentages 
of the benchmark district because then, essentially, your job has been done.”); Transcript at 
12-14, Citizens Redistricting Comm’n (Cal. Citizens Redistricting Comm’n, May 27, 2011), 
http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/downloads/transcripts/201105/transcripts_20110527_nridge. 
pdf (“Now, you need to know that the phrase ‘ability to elect’ is a term of art. And it 
essentially refers to the condition where you have a majority, so 50 plus percent that can 
elect. Because if you do, then at least theoretically you can elect candidates of your  
choice. . . . And then in particular, if there’s a situation where the C.V.A.P., the citizen 
voting age population, exceeds 50 percent or might exceed 50 percent, then I think we need 
to take extra care to make sure that whatever the new district is meets that same level, the 
-- of the ability to elect.”). 
 107. FLA. CONST. art. III, §§ 20(a), 21(a). 
 108. See In re Senate Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment 1176, 83 So. 3d 
597, 625-26 (Fla. 2012). 
 109. Id. at 645. At least, the Florida Supreme Court offered this praise in the context of 
the limited record before it; the court’s review was limited to a thirty-day period. Id. at 598. 
In particular, the court placed more emphasis on the sufficiency of the record to evaluate 
claims of retrogression—and of the state House’s attention to factors beyond demographics 
alone in the context of retrogression—than in the context of the state’s provision mirroring 
section 2 of the federal Voting Rights Act. See id. at 645.  
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Senate did not fare as well. The court specifically noted that the Sen-
ate appeared to rely on demographics and disclaimed any interest in 
further information, despite DOJ guidance to the contrary; it ap-
proached the drawing of state Senate districts ostensibly to ensure 
that new districts did not diminish the ability of minorities to elect 
representatives of their choice, “without reference to election results 
or voter-registration and political party data.”110 That is, the state 
Senate ostensibly drew districts to preserve minority political power 
with information about headcount, but without information about the 
real components of minority political power.111  
 The court rejected the state Senate’s efforts, finding that the legis-
lature could have drawn several districts in a manner more con-
sistent with other constitutional requirements, where so doing would 
have retained the same functional minority political efficacy despite 
a different demographic composition.112 Looking past the legislature’s 
essentialist shorthand, the court found opportunities for better legal 
compliance.113  
                                                                                                                  
 110. Id. at 656.  
 111. It appears that the legislature also adopted the flawed demographic approach 
when drawing congressional districts. For example, the state’s submission seeking 
preclearance for its congressional districts asserted that the new districts produced  
no retrogression, but the state cited only demographic information for this conclusion. 
See FLA. SENATE, SUBMISSION UNDER SECTION 5 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 9-11 
(2012), http://www.flsenate.gov/UserContent/Session/Redistricting/20120312Preclearance/ 
Request%20for%20Preclearance/Submission%20Memorandum%20-%20Congress.pdf. 
Moreover, courts later determined that legislators made the decision to “push” the black 
voting-age population of at least one district over 50%, ostensibly to comply with the 
Voting Rights Act, even though no increase was necessary to afford black voters a 
reasonable opportunity to elect candidates of choice. League of Women Voters of Fla. v. 
Detzner, 172 So. 3d 363, 384-85, 403-05 (Fla. 2015); see also League of Women Voters of 
Fla. v. Detzner, 179 So. 3d 258, 282-83, 285 (Fla. 2015) (noting the persistent absence of 
functional evaluation of minority political power in the legislature’s proposed remedial 
plan after initial congressional districts were invalidated). 
 112. In re Senate Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment 1176, 83 So. 3d at  
666-79. 
 113. That said, the Florida Supreme Court appeared to use a shorthand of its own that 
may be equally impermissible. The court seemed to equate districts granting an African-
American community the ability to elect its candidates of choice with districts that 
appeared to provide a reliable opportunity for Democratic candidates to win an election 
after a Democratic primary in which the majority of registered Democrats were black. See 
id. at 666-69; cf. League of Women Voters of Fla., 179 So. 3d at 272 (similarly analyzing the 
performance of congressional districts using demographics and party registration); League 
of Women Voters of Fla., 172 So. 3d at 404-05 (same). Political data in the affected regions 
of Florida may demonstrate that the African-American communities in question are 
politically cohesive and that such districts in fact provide the relevant African-American 
communities with the ability to elect their candidates of choice—but the federal Voting 
Rights Act does not permit the assumption that they do, and it is likely that Florida’s 
constitutional provisions would similarly not permit such assumptions. 
After the court’s decision, Florida redrew its state Senate districts, which were later 
struck based on partisanship exceeding state constitutional limits; a separate action 
invalidated several of the state’s congressional districts for the same reason.  See 
Stipulation and Consent Judgment at 1, League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Detzner,  
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D.   North Carolina114 
 North Carolina is certainly no stranger to undue racial stereotyp-
ing in the redistricting context: it gave rise to the Shaw v. Reno115 
line of cases establishing the constitutional cause of action for the 
unjustified predominant use of race in drawing district lines,116 and a 
decade of litigation that followed. The Supreme Court firmly in-
structed the legislators of North Carolina—and legislators elsewhere 
around the country—that the Equal Protection Clause did not permit 
districts built predominantly in order to achieve racial targets, if 
such districts were not actually necessary to achieve a sufficiently 
compelling state interest.117  
 This cycle’s redistricting seems to indicate that North Carolina 
needs a reminder. Despite the Shaw Court’s emphatic statement that 
the conditions for section 2 liability “never can be assumed,”118 the 
2011 North Carolina legislature appears to have built majority-
minority districts once again on demographics with embedded as-
sumptions about how they translate to political alignment. Per a 
state court reviewing the legislature’s plan: “[T]he General Assembly 
acknowledges that it intended to create as many VRA districts as 
needed to achieve a ‘roughly proportionate’ number of Senate, House, 
and Congressional districts as compared to the Black population in 
North Carolina,” and that “it set about to draw each of these VRA 
districts so as to include at least 50% Total Black Voting Age Popula-
tion.”119 Indeed, additional evidence indicated that the consultant 
                                                                                                                  
No. 2012-CA-002842 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. July 28, 2015), http://redistricting.lls.edu/files/FL% 
20lwv%2020150728%20stipulation.pdf (state Senate districts); League of Women Voters of 
Fla. v. Detzner, 172 So. 3d 363, 416 (Fla. 2015) (congressional districts). 
 114. Full disclosure: I joined an amicus brief of election law professors at the North 
Carolina Supreme Court, and another later brief in support of certiorari at the U.S. Supreme 
Court, on this issue. See Brief of Election Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners, Dickson v. Rucho, No. 14-839, 2015 WL 678181 (U.S. Feb. 17, 2015), 
http://redistricting.lls.edu/files/NC%20dickson%2020150217%20law%20profs.pdf; Brief of 
Amici Curiae Election Law Professors Guy-Uriel Charles et al., Dickson v. Rucho, No. 
201PA12-2, 2013 WL 9047309 (N.C. Oct. 11, 2013), http://redistricting.lls.edu/files/NC% 
20dickson%2020131011%20amici%20election.pdf. 
 115. 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
 116. Id. at 642. 
 117. Id. at 653-57. 
 118. Id. at 653. 
 119. Judgment and Memorandum of Decision, Dickson v. Rucho, Nos. 11 CVS 16896, 
11 CVS 16940, 2013 WL 3376658, at *6 (N.C. Super. Ct. July 8, 2013); see also Dickson v. 
Rucho, 766 S.E.2d 238, 245-46, 247-48, 251 (N.C. 2014) (acknowledging this unchallenged 
and unanimous finding, and calling attention to it as a “significant conclusion[]”), vacated 
by 135 S. Ct. 1843 (2015) (mem.). 
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serving as the “chief architect” of the redistricting plans was told  
to “draw a 50% plus one district wherever in the state there is a  
sufficiently compact black population to do so.”120 
 It is true that evidence at trial revealed that the legislature had 
considered electoral patterns to some degree in its conclusion that 
polarized voting persisted in North Carolina.121 But there was no evi-
dence that the legislature attempted to discern whether hitting a 
50% demographic target would be necessary (in any district, much 
less each of them) to provide an equitable opportunity for minority 
voters to elect candidates of choice. That is, there was no evidence 
that existing district structures were failing to allow minority voters 
an equal opportunity to elect candidates of choice, and that it was 
therefore necessary to move minority voters into districts to meet a 
50% magic number. The legislature, with permission from the state 
Supreme Court,122 seemed to conflate the blunt demographic thresh-
old required for private plaintiffs to lodge a claim under section 2 of 
the Voting Rights Act with the nuanced functional inquiry required 
by the Act for state action predicated on race.123 That is, the legisla-
ture set a target number of districts based on the state’s proportion of 
African-American population and determined that it would pack each 
of those target districts at least half-full of African-American adults, 
without ever determining for each district if local electoral patterns 
created the statutory responsibility to hit the predetermined racial 
target. Demographics, and demographics alone, apparently drove the 
placement of the lines.124 
E.   South Carolina  
 The evidence of pervasive demographic determinism is less clear 
in South Carolina than in some of the other states evaluated in this 
Article, but there are nevertheless disturbing indications of an overly 
blunt approach to the Voting Rights Act. Before redistricting, Afri-
                                                                                                                  
 120. Dickson, 766 S.E.2d at 263 (Beasley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Crayton, supra note 73, at 992. 
 121. Dickson, 766 S.E.2d at 250-52 (majority opinion). 
 122. Id. at 253-54. 
 123. See supra text accompanying notes 80-87. 
 124. On April 20, 2015, the United States Supreme Court granted plaintiffs’ petition 
for certiorari in the case, summarily vacated the North Carolina Supreme Court’s decision 
in light of its opinion in Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257 
(2015), and remanded for further consideration. Dickson v. Rucho, 135 S. Ct. 1843 (2015) 
(mem.).  On remand, the North Carolina Supreme Court again upheld the districting plan, 
repeating the same error of its earlier decision. See Dickson v. Rucho, 781 S.E.2d 404, 416-
17, 421-22, 431-35 (N.C. 2015). 
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can-American Representative Mia McLeod125 represented a district in 
which about 35% of the electorate was African American.126 In the 
course of the redistricting process, and without any pertinent request 
from her (or, presumably, from constituents of whom she was aware), 
she was apparently told that the chairman of the relevant legislative 
subcommittee was “working to get your BVAP (black voting age pop-
ulation) up in your District, but we’ve got to tweak it some more to 
get it just right.”127 She was apparently later told that “the lawyers” 
were advising legislators that increasing the BVAP of the district 
was required.128 The district was eventually drawn with a 52% Afri-
can-American voting age population, without any political or elec-
toral analysis indicating that minority candidates of choice would 
regularly be defeated in a district that was less packed.129 
 This lawyers’ advice was clarified in South Carolina’s legal filings, 
responding to an assertion of impermissible racial gerrymandering. 
The Speaker of the South Carolina House of Representatives claimed 
that it was “legally necessary for the General Assembly to create ma-
jority-minority districts” in areas “when the Gingles conditions were 
present”130—that “anything less” than a “numerical majority of the 
protected racial group . . . will not satisfy the mandate of Gingles.”131 
And the lawyers apparently believed that these conditions involved 
“whether a minority group can form a majority in a single-member 
district; whether the minority group is politically cohesive; and 
whether there is racial bloc voting.”132 That is, wherever there were 
large pockets of African-American voters, if there was any degree of 
racial polarization, the state sought to pack voters into districts that 
were at least 50% minority—without any attention to whether the 
candidates of choice of the minority community already had an equal 
                                                                                                                  
 125. Representative McLeod was then known by her married name: Mia Butler 
Garrick. See Dawn Hinshaw, Richland Lawmaker Not Afraid to Stir the Pot, STATE (Dec. 
16, 2012). 
 126. Affidavit of the Hon. Mia Butler Garrick at ¶ 2, Backus v. South Carolina, No. 
3:11-CV-03120 (D.S.C. Feb. 22, 2012), Doc. 147. I am not aware of a specific finding 
presented in the case that Rep. McLeod either has been or has not been the candidate of 
choice of her African-American electorate. 
 127. Id. ¶ 8. 
 128. Id. ¶ 9. 
 129. Id. ¶ 10. Additional testimony claimed that the legislative committee refused to 
draw any district that had a black voting-age population reduced from its benchmark, no 
matter whether the functional ability to elect remained constant. See Ex. B, Rep. Bakari 
Sellers Trial Transcript at 26, 29-32, Motion for Relief from a Judgment and Order, Backus 
v. South Carolina, No. 3:11-CV-03120 (D.S.C. Aug. 29, 2013), Doc. 223-3. 
 130. Post-Trial Memorandum of Defendant Robert W. Harrell, Jr. at 4, Backus v. South 
Carolina, No. 3:11-CV-03120 (D.S.C. Mar. 5, 2012), Doc. 210, http://redistricting.lls.edu/ 
files/sc%20backus%2020120305%20spkr.pdf. 
 131. Id. at 7. 
 132. Id. at 9. 
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opportunity to win elections. Accordingly, demographic thresholds 
prevailed without any analysis of the political conditions indicating 
either dilution or its absence. 
F.   Texas  
 Texas drew districts in 2011 that are still the subject of litigation 
five years later,133 despite intervening 2012 plans governing elections 
going forward.134 The 2011 plans present vivid examples of demo-
graphic determinism. Despite contrary legal advice that map drawers 
had received from nonpartisan staff,135 the architects of the Texas 
plans apparently considered their legal responsibilities complete, for 
purposes of preclearance under the Voting Rights Act, if they merely 
maintained “demographic numbers of protected districts at their 
benchmark levels.”136  
 In 2011, Texas went to court seeking an order of preclearance, 
contending that its district plans were neither retrogressive nor con-
structed with discriminatory intent.137 In the litigation, the State 
maintained the demographically deterministic position. Given a 
benchmark plan with a certain number of “districts in which Blacks 
make up forty percent of the voting-age population” or a certain 
number of districts in which “Hispanics make up fifty percent of the 
citizen voting-age population,” Texas claimed that a new plan main-
taining the same number of districts with the same demographic  
criteria would necessarily be non-retrogressive, without any need to 
                                                                                                                  
 133. See Perez v. Texas, No. 5:11-CV-00360 (W.D. Tex.). 
 134.  In 2012, with preclearance tied up in litigation, a federal court in Texas issued 
interim maps governing the 2012 elections. Perez v. Texas, 970 F. Supp. 2d 593, 597 (W.D. 
Tex. 2013) (three-judge court). In 2013, the legislature then passed new plans largely 
following these interim lines drawn by the court. Id. at 598.   
Yet the 2011 plans remain relevant. For example, if they were predicated upon 
discriminatory intent, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, a federal court may 
order Texas “bailed in” to a renewed preclearance requirement under the Voting Rights 
Act. 52 U.S.C. § 10302(c) (Supp. II 2014); see also Perez, 970 F. Supp. 2d at 601-03 
(explaining the relevance of evidence with respect to the intent behind maps passed in 
2011, for claims pending after new maps had been put in place). 
 135. See Texas v. United States, 887 F. Supp. 2d 133, 203-04 (D.D.C. 2012) (three-judge 
court), vacated on other grounds by 133 S. Ct. 2885 (2013) (mem.). 
 136. See id. (quotation omitted); see also id. at 232. It appears that the Texas map 
drawers considered as “demographic factors” not merely race and ethnicity, citizenship, 
and age, but also registration status. Id. at 203-04, 207, 232 (noting the consideration of 
the proportion of registered voters with Hispanic surnames). The drawers did not 
apparently consider other political history—including turnout, levels of cohesion and 
polarization, the size of districts and access to funds, or other factors—to be relevant to any 
responsibilities under the Voting Rights Act.  
 137. Texas, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 138-39. 
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know more about the affected population.138 That is, Texas claimed 
that the only necessary measurement of an effect on minority voters’ 
ability to elect candidates of choice is a basic headcount. 
 While Texas’s legal claim was that the Voting Rights Act requires 
only cursory maintenance of a demographic plateau, the actions of 
those in charge of the redistricting effort show that they were amply 
aware that factors other than demographics are integral to a minori-
ty community’s “ability . . . to elect their preferred candidates of 
choice.”139 The three-judge D.C. district court adjudicating the State’s 
preclearance submission found that  
[t]he mapdrawers consciously replaced many of the district’s active 
Hispanic voters with low-turnout Hispanic voters in an effort to 
strengthen the voting power of CD 23’s Anglo citizens. In other 
words, they sought to reduce Hispanic voters’ ability to elect with-
out making it look like anything in CD 23 had changed. See, e.g., 
Defs.’ Ex. 304 (email from Eric Opiela, counsel to Texas House 
Speaker Joe Straus, to mapdrawer Gerardo Interiano in November 
2010 urging Interiano to find a metric to “help pull the district’s 
Total Hispanic Pop[ulation] and Hispanic CVAPs up to majority 
status, but leave the Spanish Surname [Registered Voter] and 
[turnout numbers] the lowest,” which would be “especially valua-
ble in shoring up [CD 23 incumbent] Canseco,” [who was not the 
preferred candidate of the Hispanic voters in the area] . . . . We al-
so received an abundance of evidence that Texas, in fact, followed 
this course by using various techniques to maintain the semblance 
of Hispanic voting power in the district while decreasing its effec-
tiveness. . . . Texas’s protestations that the district has remained 
functionally identical are weakened first by the mapdrawers’ ad-
missions that they tried to reduce the effectiveness of the Hispanic 
vote and then, more powerfully, by evidence that they did.140 
                                                                                                                  
 138. Texas v. United States, 831 F. Supp. 2d 244, 253, 260 (D.D.C. 2011) (three-judge 
court), vacated on other grounds by 133 S. Ct. 2885 (2013) (mem.).  
 139. 52 U.S.C. § 10304(d) (Supp. II 2014). 
 140. Texas, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 155-56 (second, third, fourth, and fifth alteration in 
original). 
This tactic recalls one of the most notorious maps of the 1981 redistricting cycle: the 
Georgia plan that mildly increased the African-American voting-age population of 
Georgia’s lone majority-minority congressional district, while ensuring that the district 
retained a substantial Anglo majority of registered voters so that it would be unlikely to 
perform as a meaningful opportunity district for the African-American electorate. See 
Busbee v. Smith, 549 F. Supp. 494, 498-99 (D.D.C. 1982). The purported architect of the 
plan, the chair of Georgia’s House redistricting committee, explained his decisions in part 
by proclaiming, “I don’t want to draw nigger districts.” Id. at 501. 
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The D.C. court rejected the Texas methodology, starkly critiquing the 
reliance on demographic data alone.141 Indeed, the court emphasized 
that  
[s]everal districts in the proposed plans show that population sta-
tistics alone rarely gauge the strength of minority voting power 
with accuracy. For example, . . . Congressional District 23 and 
House District 117 were selectively drawn to include areas with 
high minority populations but low voter turnout, while excluding 
high minority, high turnout areas. Such districts might pass a ret-
rogression analysis under Texas’s population demographics  
test . . . even though they were engineered to decrease minority 
voting power.142 
After the Supreme Court invalidated the coverage formula driving 
the Voting Rights Act’s preclearance regime, the D.C. court’s pre-
clearance findings above were formally vacated.143 Yet even if it is no 
longer legally binding, the court’s discussion remains a valuable ex-
planation of the pragmatic impact of the divide between a nuanced 
examination of political performance and a blunt focus on de-
mographics.144   
G.   Virginia 
 Virginia seems to have adopted the same approach to preclearance 
seen in Alabama and several other states above: the state apparently 
viewed as definitional retrogression any decrease in the percentage of 
minority voters within a district that had, as a benchmark, the abil-
ity to elect candidates of choice—whether electoral realities on the 
ground actually contributed to a diminished ability to elect or not. 
Virginia designated the Third Congressional District as a district in 
which minorities had the ability to elect candidates of choice. And in 
legal filings defending District 3 against a claim of racial gerryman-
dering, the state claimed that it had “more than ‘a strong basis in 
                                                                                                                  
 141. Texas, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 260 (“We find that a simple voting-age population 
analysis cannot accurately measure minorities’ ability to elect and, therefore, that Texas 
misjudged which districts offer its minority citizens the ability to elect their preferred 
candidates in both its benchmark and proposed Plans.”); id. at 262 (“[P]opulation 
demographics alone will not fully reveal whether minority citizens’ ability to elect is or will 
be present in a voting district. Demographics alone cannot identify all districts where the 
effective exercise of the electoral franchise by minority citizens is present or may be 
diminished under a proposed plan within the meaning of Section 5.”). 
 142. Texas, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 140 n.5. 
 143. Texas v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2885 (2013) (mem.); see also Memorandum and 
Order at 1, Texas v. United States, No. 1:11-CV-01303 (D.D.C. Dec. 3, 2013), Doc. 255, 
http://redistricting.lls.edu/files/TX/20131203%20preclear%20dismiss.pdf. 
 144. As described supra note 134, the legislature’s approach in 2011 remains a live 
issue in litigation ongoing at the time of this Article’s publication; the intent to 
discriminate on the basis of race by hiding behind a pretextual demographic “obligation” 
could serve as the predicate for a return to a preclearance regime. 
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evidence’ to conclude that Section 5 prohibited any reduction in Dis-
trict 3’s BVAP, which could diminish minority voters’ ability to elect 
their ‘candidates of choice’ by making a safe black district less 
safe.”145 Indeed, it appears that the legislature acted on this belief: 
the author of the plan allegedly stated that he drew the challenged 
Third District by looking  
at the census data as to the current percentage of voting age Afri-
can American population in [CD 3] and what that percentage 
would be in the proposed lines to ensure that the new lines that 
were drawn for [CD 3] . . . would not have less percentage of voting 
age African American population under the proposed lines . . . that 
exist under the current lines under the current Congressional  
District.146  
It is true that a reduction in the proportion of African-American  
voters within a district could at some point fail to provide a commu-
nity with the reliable ability to elect a candidate of choice—but that 
depends entirely on a functional assessment of local political  
engagement. The Virginia General Assembly never conducted such 
an analysis;147 instead, it merely equated demographics with destiny. 
A federal court reviewing the General Assembly’s work recognized 
the error, critiquing the “legislature’s use of a BVAP threshold, as 
opposed to a more sophisticated analysis of racial voting patterns,”148 
and later directly echoed the Supreme Court’s Alabama decision in 
finding that the legislature “rel[ied] heavily upon a mechanically 
numerical view as to what counts as forbidden retrogression.”149 The 
court then found unlawful the linedrawing process driven by adher-
                                                                                                                  
 145. Post-Trial Brief of Intervenor-Defendants and Defendants at 31, Page v. Va. State Bd. 
of Elections, No. 3:13-CV-00678 (E.D. Va. June 20, 2014), Doc. 106 (first quoting Bush v. Vera, 
517 U.S. 952, 977 (1996) (plurality opinion); then quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(b) (2006)), 
http://redistricting.lls.edu/files/VA%20page%2020140620%20dft.pdf; cf. Intervenor-Defendants 
Va. Representatives’ Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment  at 13 n.1, 
Page v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, No. 3:13-CV-00678 (E.D. Va. Dec. 20, 2013), Doc. 39, 
http://redistricting.lls.edu/files/VA%20page%2020131220%20intervenors%20msj.pdf (claiming 
that the Voting Rights Act “prohibited any diminution in minority voters’ ability to elect their 
preferred candidate, thereby precluding reducing a majority-black district to a minority-black 
district or otherwise making a safe black district any less safe”). 
 146. Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to Defendants’ and Intervenors’ Motions for 
Summary Judgment at 17, Page v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, No. 3:13-CV-00678 (E.D. Va. 
Dec. 31, 2013) Doc. 42, http://redistricting.lls.edu/files/VA%20page%2020131231%20resp.pdf. 
 147. See Page v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, No. 3:13-CV-00678, 2015 WL 3604029, at 
*4, *9, *18 (E.D. Va. June 5, 2015), jurisdiction postponed to hearing on the merits sub nom. 
Wittman v. Personhuballah, 136 S. Ct. 499 (2015); Page v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 58 F. 
Supp. 3d 533, 539, 543-44 (E.D. Va. 2014), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Cantor v. 
Personhuballah, 135 S. Ct. 1699 (2015); Post-Trial Brief of Intervenor-Defendants and 
Defendants at 31, Page v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, No. 3:13-CV-00678 (E.D. Va. June 20, 
2014), Doc. 106, http://redistricting.lls.edu/files/VA%20page%2020140620%20dft.pdf. 
 148. Page, 58 F. Supp. 3d at 553. 
 149. Page, 2015 WL 3604029, at *17 (quoting Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. 
Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1273 (2015)). 
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ence to this artificial threshold.150 Unsupported assumptions about a 
racial community’s political allegiance or efficacy do not meet consti-
tutional muster. 
 The examples above do not purport to comprise a complete list of 
those states engaging in an unduly blunderbuss approach to Voting 
Rights Act compliance. Absent litigation over the issue, it is difficult 
to assess a state’s performance, simply because legislatures’ true con-
siderations in drawing redistricting maps are often less than  
transparent. 
 But by the same token, the list above is also relatively confined. 
Many states with specific responsibilities under the Voting Rights 
Act are undoubtedly doing the hard work necessary under the correct 
approach,151 and some courts are admirably correcting the states that 
                                                                                                                  
 150. Id. at *19. 
 151. For example, in Arizona, a consultant advising the state’s commission on Voting 
Rights Act responsibilities correctly advised the commission “that determining whether a 
minority population had the ability to elect was a complex analysis that turned on more 
than just the percentage of minorities in a district.” See Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting 
Comm’n, 993 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1056 (D. Ariz. 2014), probable jurisdiction noted, 135 S. Ct. 
2926 (2015) (mem.). The commission accordingly considered the past electoral performance 
of the communities in question. See id. at 1056-57. And although there was some dispute 
over the accuracy of the political efficacy analysis in Louisiana, it at least appears that the 
legislature considered minority electoral power beyond mere demographics. That is, the 
legislature appears to have attempted to consider whether majority-minority districts 
actually offered an effective ability to elect candidates of choice, rather than merely 
assuming the answer. See, e.g., STATEMENT OF ANTICIPATED MINORITY IMPACT 3-4, 9-19 
(2011), Louisiana Preclearance Submission for H.B. 1, att. 6, ftp://legisftp.legis.state.la.us/ 
06%20Statement%20of%20Minority%20Impact/Minority%20Impact.pdf (noting that the 
legislature extensively examined electoral data).  
It is important to emphasize that just as considering the wrong factors does not itself 
guarantee failure to abide by the substantive requirements of the Voting Rights Act, see 
infra text accompanying notes 153-54, considering the right factors (but in the wrong way) 
does not guarantee success.  
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get it wrong.152 The unjustifiably blunt approach to compliance with 
the Voting Rights Act is by no means universal. But the examples 
above show that it is sufficiently prevalent to be worrisome. 
 One final caveat is worth mentioning. The claim that the states 
above incorrectly went about the process of complying with the  
Voting Rights Act is not itself an assessment that they did not actual-
ly comply. It is entirely possible for a jurisdiction to get the analysis 
wrong but the answer—at least the statutory answer—right.153  
A state may have misgauged the appropriate way to comply with  
section 5 and yet still have drawn lines that happened to avoid retro-
gression; a state may have incorrectly attempted to comply with  
section 2 and yet still have drawn lines that provide an equal oppor-
tunity for minority voters to elect candidates of choice. 154 Those ques-
                                                                                                                  
 152. See, e.g., Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1263 (2015); 
Page, 2015 WL 3604029, at *17; Texas v. United States, 887 F. Supp. 2d 133, 203-04, 232 
(D.D.C. 2012) (three-judge court), vacated on other grounds by 133 S. Ct. 2885 (2013); In re 
Senate Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment 1176, 83 So. 3d 597, 656 (Fla. 2012).  
In two other states, courts seem to bear the primary blame for demographic shortcuts 
of a different, albeit related, nature. In Arkansas, the politician commission charged with 
drawing state legislative lines seemed to acknowledge—at least in a legal defense of the 
lines that it had already drawn—that local political realities and not merely demographics 
would be important in fulfilling its obligations under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. 
See, e.g., Governor Beebe, Atty. Gen. Dustin McDaniel & the Ark. Bd. of Apportionment’s 
Trial Brief at 35-48, Jeffers v. Beebe, No. 2:12-CV-00016 (E.D. Ark. May 2, 2012), Doc. 75. 
The court reviewing that commission’s plan, however, focused on demographics, finding 
that any district drawn with a majority of minority voting-age citizens necessarily complied 
with a section 2 obligation. Jeffers v. Beebe, 895 F. Supp. 2d 920, 932 (E.D. Ark. 2012). 
That is, under the court’s logic, in areas with section 2 obligations, a jurisdiction need only 
draw a district with a minority citizen voting-age population of 50.1% or more to immunize 
itself from challenge. Presumably, the court’s fixation on demographics alone would refuse 
to find section 2 liability even for a majority-minority district intentionally drawn in light 
of local political realities to prevent the minority community from achieving an equal 
opportunity to elect candidates of choice, and actually having that effect (as in the 
allegations in Texas, see supra text accompanying notes 139-42).  
In New Mexico, after the governor vetoed a legislative redistricting plan, the courts 
were tasked with drawing district lines. With elections impending, proceedings were 
“extremely expedited,” particularly after the trial court’s initial lines were appealed and 
returned on remand. Maestas v. Hall, 274 P.3d 66, 70 (N.M. 2012). One issue on appeal 
concerned a Hispanic population in the eastern portion of the state; the New Mexico 
Supreme Court considered presumptive proof of dilution established and directed the trial 
court to determine, on remand, “whether the relevant population is an effective Hispanic 
citizen voting-age population.” Id. at 74. However, on remand, the trial court “interpret[ed] 
the remand from the Supreme Court to require that District 63 remain as close as possible 
to its present configuration and that, at a minimum, the percentage of the Hispanic  
voting age population not be decreased.” Decision on Remand at 16, Egolf v. Duran, No.  
D-101-CV-2011-02942 (N.M. Dist. Ct. Feb. 27, 2012), http://redistricting.lls.edu/files/NM% 
20egolf%2020120227%20remand.pdf. Only a focus on demographics alone would cause the 
court to equate the two distinct standards. 
 153. It is also possible, of course, that—as the Supreme Court noted in reviewing 
Alabama’s redistricting plan—“[a]sking the wrong question may well have led to the wrong 
answer.” Ala. Legislative Black Caucus, 135 S. Ct. at 1274. 
 154. For example, the Department of Justice precleared every statewide plan 
submitted through the administrative preclearance mechanism in this redistricting cycle. 
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tions are entirely different from the main argument of this Article, 
which is that the improper use of blunt demographics alone—
whether it happens to yield a result that complies with the statutory 
responsibility or not—involves a misguided process fueled by a mis-
understanding of the Voting Rights Act with decidedly serious consti-
tutional implications. 
IV.   RATIONALES AND CONSEQUENCES 
 There are several potential explanations for the apparent preva-
lence of demographic determinism in the states above.155 The first is 
simple mistake: a real misunderstanding about what the Voting 
Rights Act requires. The cartoon version of the Act, demanding noth-
ing more than matching raw demographic percentages to a readily 
available target, is relatively easy to grasp, and relatively easy (if 
incorrect) for counsel or fellow legislators to communicate. Formal or 
informal networks of officials tasked with redistricting may have 
passed along the overly simplified conception of the Act, as any law is 
inevitably distilled to a rough approximation by those who are not 
subject-matter experts.156 To the extent that past districts were 
drawn using the shorthand but not challenged on those specific 
grounds in the courts, the districts’ survival may have bolstered a 
                                                                                                                  
See Status of Statewide Redistricting Plans, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,  http://www.justice.gov/ 
crt/about/vot/sec_5/statewides.php (last updated Aug. 6, 2015). The mere fact that the DOJ 
granted preclearance, however, does not itself indicate that the states’ approach to 
complying with section 5 was legally permissible—only that the result was deemed by DOJ 
to have hit the mark. 
 155. These potential explanations are not mutually exclusive; within and across states, 
there may well have been multiple mechanisms at work simultaneously.   
 156. See, e.g., Jeb Barnes & Thomas F. Burke, The Diffusion of Rights: From Law on 
the Books to Organizational Rights Practices, 40 L. & SOC’Y REV. 493, 503 (2006) (reviewing 
findings that a particular regulated community “demonstrated little familiarity” with a 
complex regulatory structure beyond the law’s “general mandate”); Lauren B. Edelman, 
Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights Law, 
97 AM. J. SOC. 1531, 1546 (1992) (explaining generally how professionals help to convey 
legal interpretations and models of compliance); Lauren B. Edelman & Mark C. Suchman, 
The Legal Environments of Organizations, 23 ANN. REV. SOC. 479, 500 (1997) (noting that 
“professionals can act as a kind of Greek chorus, amplifying and reifying legal [develop-
ments] in ways that may have little to do with reality”). 
In the context of Voting Rights Act compliance, this supposition provides an explana-
tion, not an excuse. It is reasonable to expect the public to have an overly broad, overly 
blunt understanding of regulation. But it is also reasonable to expect the directly regulated 
community to be a bit more steeped in the nuances of actual regulatory requirements. That 
latter expectation seems even more reasonable when the directly regulated community is, 
as with the Voting Rights Act, largely a community of legislators professionally tasked 
with ostensibly understanding and issuing complex regulation. And it is even more reason-
able still to expect legislators with profound expertise in elections and profound self-
interest in the election process to pay more attention to the nuances of a statute that con-
cerns electoral structures. 
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belief in the validity of the practice.157 And conceiving of racial or 
ethnic groups of voters as fungible tokens without engaging intra-
group political variation may be a comparatively natural mode of 
analysis for officials used to thinking about race or ethnicity in essen-
tialist ways. 
 Indeed, this explanation for the misreading demonstrates a quali-
ty of law generally: at heart, law is a system of social ordering, and  
it therefore is what societies decide that it is. Despite the Voting 
Rights Act’s constitutional foundation, statutory text, and legislative 
history—all of which demonstrate the need for nuance—and despite  
the relative consistency of administrative and judicial interpretation 
reaffirming that nuance, state legislators or their retained consult-
ants in some of the states with the most troubling racial histories 
seem to have believed in a cartoon version of the Act, and it is not 
improbable that many were (and are) sincere in believing that their 
approach was lawful. Through informal communication networks, 
these officials could have readily propagated the misunderstanding to 
like-minded others, even “confirming” the incorrect analysis as others 
agreed.158 They might thus have formed their own form of “common 
law” interpretation of the Act,159 albeit one repeatedly rejected by the 
judicial branch. For substantial portions of the regulated community, 
the statute may have actually become nothing more than the  
shorthand.160 
 It is not clear how durable this cartoon is. The Supreme Court has 
now decisively held that the Voting Rights Act rejects demographic 
determinism, with respect to one particular state and with respect to 
one particular retrogression provision now rendered impotent by 
Shelby County.161 But the Court’s decision in the Alabama Legislative 
Black Caucus case was squarely in line with the text, regulatory 
guidance, and ample judicial precedent that the state bodies above 
                                                                                                                  
 157. Cf. Andrew Karch, Emerging Issues and Future Directions in State Policy 
Diffusion Research, 7 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 54, 60 (2007) (noting that public officials may be 
more likely to adopt an approach or policy perceived to have been successful elsewhere). 
 158. See, e.g., Daniel M. Butler et al., Ideology, Learning, and Policy Diffusion: 
Experimental Evidence, 60 AM. J. POL. SCI. (forthcoming 2016), http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/ 
doi/10.1111/ajps.12213/full (reviewing the evidence that policy understandings—or 
misunderstandings—may spread more readily among those who are ideologically aligned 
or co-partisans). 
 159. Cf. Elmendorf, supra note 1 (positing that the VRA is a common law statute that 
should be interpreted and developed jointly by Congress and the courts).   
 160. See Edelman & Suchman, supra note 156, at 502 (describing the interactive process of 
social construction that drives the practical meaning of law in action, eventually producing 
a “working agreement on what the law ‘is’ and what it ‘requires,’ ” which “may gradually 
become reified and institutionalized in formal structures and rational myths”). 
 161. See Ala. Legislative Black Caucus, 135 S. Ct. at 1272-74. 
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ignored on their way to a shorthand. Beyond Alabama and beyond 
section 5, the ability of the Court’s decision to correct the popular but 
mistaken misreading remains to be seen.  
 A second explanation for the prevalence of the cartoon is admin-
istrability. Building districts upon raw demographic percentages is 
not only easy to grasp, but comparatively easy to administer. Map 
drawers who understand the nuanced electoral assessment required 
by the Voting Rights Act may nevertheless be tempted to apply the 
demographic shortcut based on limited time, budget, or attention—or 
some combination of the three.162 Even when these pressures do not 
amount to lawful justification to substitute a shorthand for a statute, 
the pressures are nevertheless both very real and very powerful.  
Similarly, because cases alleging the unconstitutional use of race are 
difficult to prove and difficult to win,163 line drawers may believe that 
they are generating less litigation risk by overcorrecting, using race 
in an unjustifiably coarse manner to create at least the facial impres-
sion that there is no substantial Voting Rights Act liability.164 In real-
ity, reliance on a target percentage alone remains unlawful,165 but 
perhaps line-drawers believe that the ham-handed approach will  
better prevent them from landing in court166 or that it can more easi-
ly be defended once there. 
 A third, and related, potential explanation may be a more strate-
gic form of “misunderstanding.” As shown above, compliance with the 
                                                                                                                  
 162. Cf. Coglianese et al., supra note 89, at 712 (noting that performance standards 
may entail larger costs and greater uncertainty); supra text accompanying note 89 
(identifying the Voting Rights Act as a performance standard rather than a design 
standard). 
 163. See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 241-42 (2001) (re-emphasizing that the 
burden of proof on the plaintiffs in such cases is “a ‘demanding one’ ” (quoting Miller v. 
Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 928 (1995))).  
 164. Cf. Edelman, supra note 156, at 1542 (positing that “[l]aws that are ambiguous, 
procedural in emphasis, and difficult to enforce invite symbolic responses—responses 
designed to create a visible commitment to law” but which may or may not mitigate the 
substantive wrongs the laws target). 
 165. Cf. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1019-20 (1994) (“Finally, we reject the 
safe harbor rule [necessarily insulating states with rough proportional control from 
liability under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act] because of a tendency the State would 
itself certainly condemn, a tendency to promote and perpetuate efforts to devise majority-
minority districts even in circumstances where they may not be necessary to achieve equal 
political and electoral opportunity.”). 
 166. Thus far in the 2011 cycle, plaintiffs have filed at least 218 distinct lawsuits 
affecting state legislative or federal redistricting. Litigation in the 2010 Cycle, ALL ABOUT 
REDISTRICTING, http://redistricting.lls.edu/cases.php (last visited Apr. 1, 2016). Only eight 
states have (thus far) escaped litigation over their statewide districts. See id. It is likely 
that those states escaped litigation not because their redistricting process and resulting 
districts conformed to a Platonic ideal, but rather because no set of litigants with the 
resources to engage the courts was sufficiently outraged by the redistricting to sue. That is, 
while the right process may well prevent the invalidation of a district map, it is not clear 
that any approach to the redistricting process can reliably prevent the filing of a suit. 
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real statute entails extra effort; as shown below, some may find  
alternatives to the real statute appealing for reasons beyond resource 
constraint. It is possible—unlikely, but possible—that those adopting 
the shorthand in the course of drawing district lines did so with the 
hope that their misreading of the Voting Rights Act would be ratified 
by the courts, and thereby become law.167 Thus far, only a few courts 
seem to have taken the bait.168 
 A fourth potential explanation is pretext for partisan or other self-
regarding political gain.169 Incumbents may seek to further personal 
or partisan political objectives by hiding behind the public cover of 
the cartoon of the Voting Rights Act: claiming, in essence, that “we 
built these districts in this way not because we want to, but because 
we have to.” In some cases, an unnecessary raw demographic target 
may serve as the excuse to overpack a district with cohesive minority 
voters, well beyond the level needed to actually comply with the Act’s 
mandates; such a district may contribute to the “safety” of the exist-
ing representative while bleaching the perceived threat of minority 
voting power in neighboring areas. This was, for example, one of the 
concerns expressed by a state judge evaluating Florida’s most recent 
redistricting.170 In other cases, an unnecessary raw demographic tar-
get may serve as the excuse to draw a district that appears to be un-
der a minority community’s control, but is actually designed to per-
form for an opponent. A federal court believed this sort of strategy to 
be the impetus for at least some districts in the 2011 Texas map—
including, notably, the same District 23 struck down by the Supreme 
Court in 2006 for the very same reason.171  
 A final potential explanation also involves pretext for partisan po-
litical gain, but of a different and darker nature. In South Carolina, a 
                                                                                                                  
 167. I am grateful to Joseph Doherty for the insight. 
 168. See Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1301-02 
(M.D. Ala. 2013), vacated by 135 S. Ct. 1257 (2015); Dickson v. Rucho, 781 S.E.2d 404, 416-
17, 421-22, 431-35 (N.C. 2015). 
 169. See, e.g., Crayton, supra note 73, at 1008. 
 170. In re Senate Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment 1176, 83 So. 3d 597, 
693 (Fla. 2012) (Perry, J., concurring) (“It concerns me that under the guise of minority 
protection, there is—at the very least—an appearance that the redistricting process sought 
to silence the very representatives of the people the Legislature indicates it is trying to 
protect. For example, during floor debate one such representative, Senator Arthenia 
Joyner, rose in opposition to the redistricting plan, stating: ‘I believe that [the 
reapportionment plan] was prepared in violation of Florida’s Redistricting standards. 
Specifically I believe the Legislature is poised to use the pretext of minority protection to 
advance an agenda that seeks to preserve incumbency and pack minority seats in order to 
benefit a particular party.’ ”) (alteration in original) (footnote omitted). 
 171. Compare Texas v. United States, 887 F. Supp. 2d 133, 155 (D.D.C. 2012), vacated 
on other grounds by 133 S. Ct. 2885 (2013) (mem.), with League of United Latin Am. 
Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 424-25 (2006); see also id. at 440-41 (noting the “use of race 
to create the facade of a Latino district” that was actually designed “to protect [incumbent] 
Congressman Bonilla from a constituency that was increasingly voting against him”). 
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state representative related the following anecdote in a sworn affida-
vit submitted in federal court: 
As the conversation turned to redistricting, Rep. Viers told me that 
race was a very important part of the Republican redistricting strat-
egy. . . . Rep. Viers said that Republicans were going to get rid of 
white Democrats by eliminating districts where white and black 
voters vote together to elect a Democrat. He said the long-term goal 
was a future where a voter who sees a “D” by a candidate’s name 
knows that the candidate is an African-American candidate. . . . 
Then he chuckled and said, “Well now, South Carolina will soon be 
black and white. Isn’t that brilliant?”172  
It is not necessary to subscribe to this latter view of the rationale for 
drawing districts based on demographics alone in order to find the 
practice disturbing. All of the explanations above fail to justify a 
practice that is intentionally discriminatory if pretextual, and unduly 
dependent on essentialist assumptions if not. As most courts have 
thus far recognized, the Voting Rights Act does not require, and the 
Constitution does not permit, shortcuts based solely on blunt minori-
ty population targets. Congress has demanded, and is constitutional-
ly entitled to demand, more. 
 Indeed, by failing to account for real local electoral behaviors, the 
legislators operating on demographic assumptions are subscribing to 
a retrograde conception of race relations that undermines a good deal 
of what the Voting Rights Act was designed to accomplish. It betrays 
the very heart of the Act, which acknowledges that race and ethnicity 
are complex and nuanced concepts without fixed political conse-
quences. Those drawing district lines based on demographic targets 
alone are conforming only to a dangerously essentialist cartoon. 
Courts—and consultants to the redistricting process who are worth 
their fees—should not hesitate to remind line-drawers that they 
should be paying more attention to the actual statute on the books. 
                                                                                                                  
 172. Affidavit of the Hon. Mia Butler Garrick at ¶ 16, Backus v. South Carolina, No. 
3:11-CV-03120 (D.S.C. Feb. 22, 2012), Doc. 147. 
